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Abstract
This paper analyzes the market behavior and optimal investment strategies to attain relative arbitrage
both in the N investors and mean field regimes. An investor competes with a benchmark of market and peer
investors, expecting to outperform the benchmark and minimizing the initial capital.
With market price of risk processes depending on the stock market and investors respectively, the minimal
initial capital required is the optimal cost in theN-player games and mean field games. It can be characterized
as the smallest nonnegative continuous solution of a Cauchy problem. The measure flow of wealth appears
in the cost, while the joint flow of wealth and strategy is in state processes. We modify the extended mean
field game with common noise and its notion of the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. There is a unique
equilibrium in N-player games and mean field games with mild conditions on the equity market.
1 Introduction
This paper discusses a differential game system of relative arbitrage problems where investors aim to outperform
not only the market index but also peer investors.
The relative arbitrage problem is defined in stochastic portfolio theory, see Fernholz [9], in the sense that
a strategy outperforms a benchmark portfolio at the end of a certain time span. It shows in [11] that relative
arbitrage can exist in equity markets that resemble actual markets, and that the relative arbitrage results
from market diversity, a condition that prevents the concentration of all the market capital into a single stock.
Specific examples of market including the stabilized volatility model, in which relative arbitrage exists, are
introduced in [10]. Our model arises from the pioneering work of Fernholz and Karatzas [7], which characterizes
the best possible relative arbitrage with respect to the market portfolio, and derives nonanticipative investment
strategies of the best arbitrage in a Markovian setting. The best arbitrage opportunity is further analyzed in [8]
in a market with Knightian uncertainty. The smallest proportion of the initial market capitalization is described
as the min-max value of a zero-sum stochastic game between the investor and the market. Further investigation
of exploiting relative arbitrage opportunities has been done in [1, 12, 26, 27]. The papers [24] and [29] connect
relative arbitrage with information theory and optimal transport problems.
However, most of the literature on relative arbitrage uses an absolute benchmark such as market portfo-
lio. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that discusses relative arbitrage with respect to a
relative benchmark – matching the performances of a group of investors in a stochastic differential game. Our
paper modifies the original relative arbitrage problem to provide a general structure of the market and optimal
portfolios that allows the interaction among investors.
This paper first considers N investors in an equity marketM over a time horizon r0, T s. We consider N is big
so that the equity trading of this group as a whole contributes to the evolution of the market; whereas individuals
among the group are too “small” to bring changes to the market. These investors interact with the market
through a joint distribution of their wealth and strategies, particularly for example, through the total investments
of this group to the assets. There are n stocks with prices-per-share driven by n independent Brownian motions
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W “ pW1, . . . ,Wnq. The n-dimensional price process XN “ pXN1 , . . . , XNn q follows a nonlinear stochastic
differential equation
dXN ptq “ XN ptqβpt,XN ptq, νNt qdt` XN ptqσpt,XN ptq, νNt qdWt (1)
in which its drift β and diffusion σ coefficients depend on the joint empirical measure
νNt :“
1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
δpV ℓptq,πℓptqq (2)
of portfolio strategy and wealth of N investors. To emphasize the dependence of wealth on the initial capital-
ization and portfolio, we write V ℓ “ V vℓ,πℓ for ℓ “ 1, . . . , N . We show the market model is well-posed through
a finite dynamical system.
To specify what we mean by relative arbitrage opportunities in this problem set-up, we first define a bench-
mark process VN by the weighted average performance of the market and the investors
VNptq “ δ ¨XNptq ` p1´ δq ¨ 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
V ℓptq{vℓ, 0 ď t ď T ,
with a fixed weight δ P r0, 1s. An investor achieves the relative arbitrage if his/her terminal wealth can out-
perform this benchmark by cℓ, a constant personal index for the investor ℓ, given at time 0. Furthermore, A
N
denotes all admissible, self-financing long-only portfolios for N investors.
The first question raised in this paper is: What is the best strategy one can take, so that the arbitrage relative
to the above benchmark can be attained? Specifically, every investor we study aims to outperform the market
and their competitors, starting with as little proportion of the benchmark capital as possible. Mathematically,
given the other pN ´ 1q investors’ portfolios π´ℓ P AN´1, the objective of investor ℓ, ℓ “ 1, . . . , N , is formulated
as
uℓpT q “ inf
!
ωℓ P p0,8q
ˇˇˇ
Dπℓp¨q P A such that vℓ “ ωℓVN p0q, V vℓ,πℓpT q ą ecℓVN pT qu
Since the interactions of a large group of investors are through stocks, portfolios and wealth, the next question
arises is: Is it possible for every investor to take the optimal strategy in the market M? We characterize the
optimal wealth one can achieve by the unique Nash equilibrium of the finite population game. Here we denote the
objective as u˜ℓT´t to emphasize the time homogeneity in the coefficients of the market model, see Assumption 6.
Using open loop or closed loop controls arrives at the same expression of u˜ℓT´t, which is the smallest nonnegative
solution of a Cauchy problem
Bu˜ℓpτ,xN ,yq
Bt “ Au˜
ℓpτ,xN ,yq, pτ,xN ,yq P p0, T s ˆ p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn ,
u˜ℓp0,xN ,yq “ ecℓ , pxN ,yq P p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn,
wherein A is an operator defined in (27), Yptq is the empirical mean of νNt , see (7). The resulting strategy we
consider is
πℓ‹i “miptq `XNi ptqDiv˜ptq ` τiptqσ´1ptqDpi v˜ptq,
where
v˜ptq “ log u˜ℓT´t `
1´ δ
δXNt
¨ 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
V ℓt log u˜
ℓ
T´t.
It turns out that πℓ‹i and u˜
ℓ
T´t are proportional to cℓ. We show the existence of relative arbitrage through
modified portfolio generating functions and the Fichera drift.
After the discussion of N -player games of relative arbitrage, this paper applies the philosophy of mean field
games from [4] and [15] to search for approximate Nash equilibrium when N Ñ 8. It is expected to be more
tractable than the N -player games and might give us more information of the finite investors situation. This
approach of comparing N -player game and the corresponding mean field game is also discussed in [20], where
the Merton problems with constant equilibrium strategies are studied. General results on limits of N -player
game are first developed in [16] and [21]. The large population system in these papers are reformulated by [3]
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into the stochastic version to accommodate with the common noise. With the notion of weak MFG, [18] and
[5] study mean field game with common noise in open loop equilibrium.
The relative arbitrage problem provide a new application and some modifications in mean field games.
Because of the special problem set-up, there are two mean field measures evolve in different directions, while the
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium depend on one of the measures. In particular, the objective relies on a weighted
average of stock prices and the distribution of wealth
Jνpπq :“ inf
!
ω ą 0 ˇˇ v “ ωVp0q, V v,πpT q ě ec ¨ VpT q),
where the mean field benchmark is given by
VpT q “ δ ¨XpT q ` p1´ δq ¨mT , m :“ ErV |FBs.
On the other hand, the state processes depend on the conditional law of wealth and strategies ν :“ LawpV, π|FBq
with respect to the Brownian motion B. This yields the McKean-Vlasov SDEs of stock prices and a represen-
tative player’s wealth
dXt “ βpXt, νt,mtqdt` spXt, νt,mtqdBt, Xp0q “ x;
dVt “ πptqβpXt, νt,mtqdt` πptqσpXt, νt,mtqdBt, V p0q “ u˜pT qVp0q.
A modified extended mean field game model is introduced. Both open and closed loop equilibrium are con-
sidered here regarding the well-posedness of mean field system and the approximation of games. We summarize
these results in the following diagram.
Market dynamics Relative arbitrage of N investors§§§đ §§§đ
N -particle dynamics
Theorem 4.1ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ N -player Nash Equilibrium
Proposition D.2§§§đ
Proposition 6.1§§§đ
Proposition 6.2İ§§§
8-particle dynamics Theorem 5.1ÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ Mean Field Equilibrium
Main Contributions
From the perspective of portfolio theory, we construct a general framework for multi-player portfolio opti-
mization problem with no assumption on the equivalent martingale measure. We propose an interactive market
model and introduce a relative arbitrage benchmark including peers and the market. The model is characterized
as N -player games and mean field games in both open and closed loop, Markovian and non-Markovian case.
Additionally, the portfolio generated functionals in SPT are defined accordingly in the multi-player settings. To
our knowledge, this is the first paper to study Stochastic Portfolio Theory with market-investors interactions.
From the perspective of stochastic games, this paper contributes to mean field vs N -player game approach
and its applications. Firstly, we establish a modified extended mean field game and accommodate a scheme to
seek the mean field equilibrium: The infinite-player system involves two different fixed point conditions about
the cost functional and the state processes, whereas only one of them is required to be unique. Secondly, we use
a stochastic cost function instead of deterministic functions of states and controls, and demonstrate a Cauchy
problem path to solve N -player and mean field games instead of the typical HJB or FBSDEs approaches.
Organization of this Paper
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the market with N investors as a well-
posed interacting particles system. Section 3 discusses the relative arbitrage problem and market price of risk
processes. In Section 4, the existence and optimization of relative arbitrage is derived in N -player games.
The functional generated portfolios in N -player set-up are constructed. Section 5 presents the problem under
extended mean field games. We show in Section 6 that mean field game limit is indeed a nice approximation to
the N -players game. Finally, we include theoretical supports of the model in Appendix.
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2 The Market Model
We consider an equity market and focus on the market behavior and a group of investors in this market. The
number of investors is large enough to affect the market. Nevertheless, there are other investors apart from this
very group we consider.
2.1 Capitalizations
For a given time horizon r0, T s, an admissible market model M we use in this paper is consisted of a given
n dimensional Brownian motion W p¨q “ pW1p¨q, . . . ,Wnp¨qq1 on the probability space pΩ,F ,Pq. Filtration F
represents the “flow of information” in the market, where F “ tFptqu0ďtă8 “ tσpωpsqq; 0 ă s ă tu with Fp0q “
tH,Ωu, mod P. W p¨q is adapted to the P-augmentation of F. All the local martingales and supermartingales
are with respect to the filtration F if not written out specifically.
Thus, there are n risky assets (stocks) with prices-per-share XN p¨q “ pXN1 p¨q, . . . , XNn p¨qq driven by n
independent Brownian motions as follows: for t P r0, T s, ω P Ω,
dXNi ptq “ XNi ptqpβipt, ωqdt`
nÿ
k“1
σikpt, ωqdWkptqq, i “ 1, . . . , n, (3)
or
XNi ptq “ xNi exp
"ż t
0
pβips, ωq ´ 1
2
nÿ
k“1
pσikps, ωqqq2dt`
nÿ
k“1
ż t
0
σikps, ωqdWkpsq
*
,
with initial condition XNi p0q “ xNi . We assume in this paper that dimpW ptqq “ dimpXN ptqq “ n, that is, we
have exactly as many sources of randomness as there are stocks in the market M. The market M is hence a
complete market. The dimension n is chosen to be large enough to avoid unnecessary dependencies among the
stocks we define.
Here, βp¨q “ pβ1p¨q, . . . , βnp¨qq1 : r0, T s ˆ Ω Ñ Rn as the mean rates of return for n stocks and σp¨q “
pσikp¨qqnˆn : r0, T s ˆ Ω Ñ GLpnq as volatilities are assumed to be invertible, F-progressively measurable in
which GLpnq is the space of nˆ n invertible real matrices. Then W p¨q is adapted to the P-augmentation of the
filtration F. To satisfy the integrability condition, we assume
nÿ
i“1
ż T
0
ˆ
|βipt, ωq| ` αiipt, ωq
˙
dt ă 8, (4)
where αp¨q :“ σp¨qσ1p¨q, αii is the covariance process of XNi .
2.2 Wealth and Portfolios
In the above market model, there are N small investors, “small” is in the sense that each individual of these
N investors has very little influence on the overall system. An investor ℓ uses the proportion πℓi ptq of current
wealth V ℓptq to invest in the stock i at each time t for ℓ “ 1, . . . , N . The wealth process V ℓ of an individual
investor ℓ is
dV ℓptq
V ℓptq “
nÿ
i“1
πℓi ptq
dXNi ptq
XNi ptq
, V ℓp0q “ vℓ. (5)
Since equity prices move according to the supply and demand for stock shares, we consider the average capital
invested as a factor in the price processes.
Definition 2.1 (Investment strategy, long only portfolio and average capital invested). (1) An F-progressively
measurable and adapted process πℓ : r0,8q ˆ ΩÑ Rn is called an investment strategy ifż T
0
p|πℓ1pt, ωqβpt, ωq| ` πℓ1pt, ωqαpt, ωqπℓpt, ωqqdt ă 8, T P p0,8q, ω P Ω, a.s. (6)
The strategy here is self-financing, since the wealth at any point of time is obtained by trading the initial
wealth according to the strategy πp¨q.
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(2) πℓp¨q “ pπℓ
1
p¨q, . . . , πℓnp¨qq1 is a long-only portfolio if it is a portfolio that takes values in the set
∆n :“ tπ “ pπ1, ..., πnq P Rn|π1 ě 0, . . . , πn ě 0;π1 ` . . .` πn “ 1u.
An investment strategy that takes value in ∆n is called an admissible strategy, and we denote the admissible
set as A. If πℓ P A, for all ℓ “ 1, . . . , N , then pπ1, . . . , πN q P AN . In the rest of the paper, we only consider
strategies in the admissible set A.
(3) Each investor ℓ uses the proportion πℓi ptq of current wealth V ℓptq to invest in the ith stock at each time t.
The average amount Yiptq invested by N players on stock i is assumed to satisfy
Yiptq “ 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
V ℓptqπℓi ptq “
ż t
0
γipr, ωqdr `
ż t
0
nÿ
k“1
τikpr, ωqdWkprq, t P p0,8q
1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
V ℓp0qπℓi p0q “ y0,i,
(7)
where γp¨q and τp¨q follow
nÿ
i“1
ż T
0
ˆ
|γipt, ωq| ` ψiipt, ωq
˙
dt ă 8 (8)
for every T P r0,8q, ψp¨q :“ τp¨qτ 1p¨q.
In fact, the average capitalization Yptq is depending entirely upon XN ptq and πptq. The process in Defini-
tion 2.1(3) is defined for simplicity.
2.3 General finite dynamical system
The interaction between the players is of the mean field type, in that whenever an individual player has to make
a decision, he or she sees the average of functions of the private states of the other players. Here we use mean
field interaction particle models from statistical physics to describe the market - We model the N investors as
N particles, for fixed N .
For any metric space pX, dq, PpXq denotes the space of probability measures on X endowed with the topology
of weak convergence. PppXq is the subspace of PpXq of the probability measures of order p. Then µ P PppXq
holds
ş
X
dpx, x0qpµpdxq ă 8, where x0 P X is an arbitrary reference point. For p ě 1, µ, ν P PppXq, The
p-Wasserstein metric on PppXq is defined by
Wppν1, ν2qp “ inf
πPΠpν1,ν2q
ż
XˆX
dpx, yqpκpdx, dyq,
where d is the underlying metric on the space. Πpν1, ν2q is the set of Borel probability measures π on X ˆ X
with first marginal ν1 and second marginal ν2. Precisely, κpA ˆ Xq “ ν1pAq and κpX ˆ Aq “ ν2pAq for every
Borel set A Ă X.
Also, denote by Cpr0, T s;Rd0q the space of continuous functions from r0, T s to Rd0 . In this paper, we often
take X “ Rd0 when considering a real-valued random variable or take X as the path space X “ Cpr0, T s;Rd0q
for a process, where a fixed number d0 will be specified later. PppRd0q equipped with the Wasserstein distance
Wp is a complete separable metric space, since Rd0 is complete and separable.
Definition 2.2 (Empirical measure in the finite N -particle system). Consider pV ℓ, πℓq P Cpr0, T s;R`q ˆ
Cpr0, T s;Aq that are F-measurable random variables, for every investor ℓ “ 1, . . . , N . We define empirical
measures νN P P2pCpr0, T s,R`qˆCpr0, T s,Aqq – P2pCpr0, T s,R`ˆAqq of the random vectors pV ℓptq, πℓptqq as
νNt :“
1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
δpV ℓptq,πℓptqq, @ ℓ “ 1, . . . , N,
where δx is the Dirac delta mass at x P R` ˆ A. Thus for any Borel set A Ă R` ˆ A,
νNt pAq “
1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
δ
A
pV ℓptq,πℓptqq “
1
N
¨#tℓ ď N : pV ℓptq, πℓptqq P Au.
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The admissible strategies πptq might have different structures given the accessible information at time t.
Definition 2.3. A control πptq P A is an open loop control if it is a function of time t and initial states v0.
It is called a closed loop feedback control if πptq P A is a function of time t and states of every controller
Vptq. It is specified by feedback functions φℓ : r0, T s ˆ Ωˆ Rn` Ñ A, for ℓ “ 1, . . . , N , to be evaluated along the
path of the state process.
Denote XNt “ pX1ptq, . . . , Xnptqq, Vt “ pV 1ptq, . . . , V N ptqq. For a fixed N , with νNt in definition 2.2 that
generalizes Yptq, we can generalize the N -particle system as
dXNt “ XNt βpt,XNt , νNt qdt` XNt σpt,XNt , νNt qdWt; XN0 “ xN0 (9)
and
dV ℓt “ V ℓt πℓtβpt,XNt , νNt qdt` V ℓt πℓtσpt,XNt , νNt qdWt; V ℓ0 “ vℓ. (10)
A strong solution of the conditional Mckean-Vlasov system (9)-(10) is a triplet pXN ,V, νN q, with XN taking
values in Cpr0, T s,Rn`q, V in Cpr0, T s,RN` q, νN P P2pCpr0, T s,R`q ˆ Cpr0, T s,Aqq – P2pCpr0, T s,R` ˆ Aqq.
The following assumptions on the triplet ensure that the system is well-posed.
Assumption 1. The initial wealth and strategies of the N players are i.i.d samples from νN
0
the distribution
of pv0, π0q. The stock prices at time 0, x0, has a finite second moment, E|x0|2 ă 8, and is independent of
Brownian motion tWtu.
Assumption 2. The following Lipschitz conditions are satisfied with Borel measurable mappings β, σ from
r0, T s ˆ Cpr0, T s,R`q ˆ P2pCpr0, T s,R` ˆ Aqq to Rn, i.e., there exists a constant L P p0,8q, such that
|xβpt, x, νq ´ x1βpt, x1, ν1q| ` |xσpt, x, νq ´ x1σpt, x1, ν1q| ď Lr|x´ x1| `W2pν, ν1qs
|vβpt, x, νq ´ v1βpt, x1, ν1q| ` |vσpt, x, νq ´ v1σpt, x1, ν1q| ď Lr|px, vq ´ px1, v1q| `W2pν, ν1qs
and the growth conditions for a constant CG P p0,8q,
|xβpt, x, νq| ` |xσpt, x, νq| ď CGp1` |x| `M2pνqq,
|vβpt, x, νq| ` |vσpt, x, νq| ď CGp1 ` |x| ` |v| `M2pνqq,
for every t P r0, T s, x P Rn`, ν P P2pCpr0, T s,R` ˆ Aq, where
M2pνq “
ˆż
Cpr0,T s,R`ˆAq
|x|2dνpxq
˙1{2
; ν P P2pCpr0, T s,R` ˆ Aqq.
Assumption 3. For a closed loop feedback control, we assume πℓ is Lipschitz on v, i.e., there exists a mapping
φℓ : Rn` ˆ RN` ˆ P2pCpr0, T s,R` ˆ Aqq Ñ A such that πℓt “ φℓpVtq.
|φℓpx, v, νq ´ φℓpx1, v1, ν1q| ď Lr|px, vq ´ px1, v1q| `W2pν, ν1qs
for every x, x1 P Rn`, v, v1 P Rn`, ν, ν1 P P2pCpr0, T s,R` ˆ Aqq
Proposition 2.1. Under Assumption 2 and 3, the N -particle SDE system (9)-(10) admits a unique strong
solution, for each N .
Proof. For simplicity, we discuss the time homogeneous case, whereas the inhomogeneous case can be proved in
the same fashion. Rewrite the system as a n`N -dimension SDE system:
d
ˆ
XNt
Vt
˙
“
¨˚
˚˚˚˚
˚˝
XN1 ptqβ1pXNt , νNt qdt`X1ptq
řn
k“1 σ1kpXNt , νNt qdWkptq
. . .
XNn ptqβnpXNt , νNt qdt`Xnptq
řn
k“1 σnkpXNt , νNt qdWkptq
V 1t π
11
t βpXNt , νNt qdt` V 1t π11t σpXNt , νNt qdWt
. . .
V Nt π
N 1
t βpXNt , νNt qdt` V Nt πN 1t σpXNt , νNt qdWt
‹˛‹‹‹‹‹‚:“ fpX
N
t ,Vt, ν
N
t qdt`gpXNt ,Vt, νNt qdWt,
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where fpXNt ,Vt, νtq “ pf1p¨q, . . . , fn`Np¨qq, fip¨q “ XNi ptqβip¨q for i “ 1, . . . , n, fjp¨q “ πj´nt βp¨q for j “
n ` 1, . . . , n ` N . Similiarly, gpXNt ,Vt, νtq “ pg1p¨q, . . . , gn`N p¨qq, gip¨q “ XNi ptqσip¨q for i “ 1, . . . , n, gj “
V
j´n
t π
j´n
t σpXNt , νtq for j “ n` 1, . . . , n`N .
Let us consider a closed loop strategy πℓt “ φℓpVtq. Open loop strategies case can be show in the same way.
Define a mapping LN : R
N
` Ñ P2pCpr0, T s,R` ˆ Aqq,
LNpVtq “ 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
δpV ℓt ,φ
ℓpVtqq “ νNt .
Define F : RN`n` Ñ RN`n, G : RN`n` Ñ RN`n ˆ Rn, with
F pXt,Vtq “ fpXt,Vt, LN pVtqq; GpXt,Vtq “ gpXt,Vt, LNpVtqq.
Let px, vq “ px1, . . . , xn, v1, . . . , vN q and py, uq “ py1, . . . , yn, u1, . . . , uNq be two pairs of values of pX p¨q,Vp¨qq.
By the inequality pa` bq2 ď 2pa2 ` b2q, uniformly boundedness and Lipschitz condition of φℓ,
|F px, vq ´ F py, uq|2
ď
nÿ
i“1
|xiβipx, LN pvqq ´ yiβipy, LNpuqq|2 `
Nÿ
ℓ“1
|vℓφℓpvqβpx, LN pvqq ´ uℓφℓpuqβpy, LN puqq|2
ď2L2r|x´ y|2 ` |v ´ u|2 `NW2
2
pLN pvq, LN puqs.
Denote the empirical measure induced by the joint distribution of random variable u and v by
π˜ “ 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
δpuℓ,vℓq.
It is a coupling of the function LN pvq and LNpuq. By the definition of Wasserstein distance,
W2
2
pLN pvq, LN puqq ď
ż
RNˆRN
|v ´ u|2π˜pdv, duq ď 1
N
|v ´ u|2
We treat Gp¨q in the same fashion, and consequently,
|F px, vq ´ F py, uq|2 ď 4L2r|x´ y|2 ` |v ´ u|2s, |Gpx, vq ´Gpy, uq|2 ď 4L2r|x´ y|2 ` |v ´ u|2s.
Then according to the existence and uniqueness conditions of multi-dimensional SDEs, the system (9)-(10)
admits a unique strong solution.
3 Optimization of relative arbitrage in finite systems
3.1 Arbitrage relative to the market and investors
We first recall the definition of relative arbitrage in Stochastic Portfolio Theory.
Definition 3.1 (Relative Arbitrage). Given two investment strategies πp¨q and ρp¨q, with the same initial capital
V πp0q “ V ρp0q “ 1, we shall say that πp¨q represents an arbitrage opportunity relative to ρp¨q over the time
horizon r0, T s, with a given T ą 0, if
P
`
V πpT q ě V ρpT q˘ “ 1 and P`V πpT q ą V ρpT q˘ ą 0,
The market portfolio m is used to describe the behavior of the market: By investing in proportion to the
market weight of each stock,
πmi ptq :“
XNi ptq
XNptq , i “ 1, . . . , n, t ě 0, (11)
it amounts to the ownership of the entire market - the total capitalization
XNptq “ XN
1
ptq ` . . .`XNn ptq,
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for t ě 0, since
dVmptq
Vmptq “
nÿ
i“1
πmi ptq ¨
dXNi ptq
XNi ptq
“ dX
Nptq
XN ptq , t ě 0; V
mp0q “ XNp0q. (12)
The performance of a portfolio is measured withh respect to the market portfolio and other factors. For
example, asset managers improves not only absolute performance comparing to the market index, but also
relative performance with respect to all collegial managers - they try to exploit strategies that achieve an
arbitrage relative to market and peer investors. We next define the benchmark of the overall performance.
Definition 3.2 (Benchmark). Relative arbitrage benchmark VN pT q, which is the weighted average of perfor-
mances of the market portfolio and the average portfolio of N investors, is defined as,
VNpT q “ δ ¨XN pT q ` p1´ δq ¨ 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
V ℓpT q
vℓ
, T P p0,8q, (13)
with a given constant weight 0 ă δ ă 1.
We assume each investor measures the logarithmic ratio of their own wealth at time T to the benchmark
in (13), and searches for a strategy with which the logarithmic ratio is above a personal level of preference
almost surely. For ℓ “ 1, . . . , N , we denote the investment preference of investor ℓ by cℓ, a real number given at
t “ 0. Note that cℓ is investor-specific constant, and so it might be different among individuals ℓ “ 1, . . . , N .
An arbitrary investor ℓ tries to achieve
log
V ℓpT q
VN pT q ą cℓ, a.s. or equivalently, V
ℓpT q ě ecℓVN pT q, a.s.. (14)
Thus VN pT q is the benchmark and an investor ℓ aims to match ecℓVN pT q based on their preferences.
Assumption 4. Assume that the preferences of investors cℓ are statistically identical and independent samples
from a common distribution Lawpcq.
Assumption 5. We assume the existence of a market price of risk processes θ, λ : r0,8qˆΩˆP2pCpr0, T s,R`ˆ
Aqq Ñ Rn, an F-progressively measurable process such that for any pt, ω, νq P r0,8qˆΩˆP2pCpr0, T s,R`ˆAqq,
σpt, ω, νqθpt, ω, νq “ βpt, ω, νq, τpt, ω, νqλpt, ω, νq “ γpt, ω, νq; (15)
P
ˆż T
0
||θpt, ω, νq||2 ` ||λpt, ω, νq||2dt ă 8,@T P p0,8q
˙
“ 1.
The new price of risk process λptq is from the fact that the market is simultaneously defined by the stocks
and the investors. In future sections, We shall see λptq is a key entity for more tractable and practical results
in game formations. Next we define the deflator based on the market price of risk processes.
Definition 3.3. We define a local martingale Lptq,
dLptq “ ΘptqLptqdWt, where Θptq “
a
||θptq||2 ` ||λptq||2.
Equivalently,
Lptq :“ exp
!
´
ż t
0
pθ1psq ` λ1psqqdW psq ´ 1
2
ż t
0
p||θpsq||2 ` ||λpsq||2qds
)
, 0 ď t ă 8.
Thus under Assumption 5, the market is endowed with the existence of a local martingale L with ErLpT qs ď 1.
We denote the discounted processes pV ℓp¨q :“ V ℓp¨qLp¨q, and pXp¨q :“ Xp¨qLp¨q. pV ℓp¨q admits
dpV ℓptq “ pV ℓptqπℓ1ptq`βptq ´ σptqΘptq˘dt` pV ℓptq`πℓ1ptqσptq ´Θ1ptq˘dW ptq; pV ℓp0q “ pvℓ. (16)
Proposition 3.1. We have the following properties of cℓ and δ.
1. In [7] a special case is considered, when cℓ “ c for every ℓ “ 1, . . . , N , and δ “ 1;
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2. If every investor achieves relative arbitrage opportunity in the sense of (14), then
p1´ δq
Nÿ
ℓ“1
ecℓ
vℓ
ă 1; (17)
3. Relative arbitrage is guaranteed, if pc1, . . . , cNq satisfies that
cℓ ď log
ˆ
V ℓpT q
mintXNpT q, V 1pT q, . . . , V N pT qu
˙
a.s.; (18)
4. When cℓ ě log vℓ ´ logpδv ` 1´ δq, if LpT q is a martingale, then no arbitrage relative to the market and
investors is possible.
We already know from [7] and [8] that any cℓ ď 0 is a valid level of satisfaction. (17) in Proposition 3 tells
us that cℓ can be a small positive number. Investors pursuing relative arbitrage should follow the condition (17)
for cℓ.
Now, we shall answer the questions posed in the introduction - Given the portfolios
π´ℓp¨q :“ pπ1p¨q, . . . , πℓ´1p¨q, πℓ`1p¨q, . . . , πN p¨qq,
of all but investor ℓ, what is the best strategy to achieve relative arbitrage for investor ℓ “ 1, . . . , N , and if there
exists such optimal strategy, is it possible for all N investors to follow it? We first utilize an idea in the same
vein of optimal relative arbitrage in [7], i.e., using the optimal strategy πℓ‹, the investor ℓ will start with the
least amount of the initial capital (or initial cost) relative to VNp0q, in order to match or exceed the benchmark
ecℓVN pT q at the terminal time T , that is, given π´ℓp¨q, each investor ℓ optimizes
uℓpT q “ inf
"
ωℓ P p0,8q
ˇˇˇ
Dπℓp¨q P A such that vℓ “ ωℓVN p0q, V vℓ,πℓpT q ą ecℓ ¨ VNpT q
*
. (19)
To use martingale representation results in a complete market, we assume F “ FXN ,Y “ FW , where FXN ,Y
is tσpXN psq,Ypsqq; 0 ă s ă tu. The following proposition is essential to allow a PDE characterization of the
objective uℓpT q. This result follows from the supermartingale property of pV ℓp¨q and martingale representation
theorem, see Appendix B for the details of the proof.
Proposition 3.2. uℓpT q in (19) can be derived as ecℓVN pT q’s discounted expected values over P.
uℓpT q “ E“ecℓVN pT qLpT q‰ {VNp0q, (20)
3.2 PDE characterization of the control problem
Starting from this section, we consider XN ptq and Yptq are time homogeneous processes.
Assumption 6. βptq, σptq, γptq and τptq are time-homogeneous, i.e.,
XNi ptqβiptq “ bipXN ,Yq, XNi ptqσikptq “ sikpXN ,Yq,
nÿ
k“1
sikptqsjkptq “ aijpXN ,Yq,
γiptq “ γipXN ,Yq, τiptq “ τipXN ,Yq.
where bi, sik, aij , γi, τi : p0,8qnˆp0,8qn Ñ R are Ho¨lder continuous and Y :“ pY1pr0, T sq, . . . ,Ynpr0, T sqq is the
total trading volume defined in (7). Market price of risk is ΘpxN ,yq :“ σ´1pxN ,yqbpxN ,yq, for each T P p0,8q.
We define u˜ℓ : p0,8q ˆ p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn Ñ p0,8q from the processes pXN p¨q,Yp¨qq starting at px,yq P
p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn, and write the terminal values
u˜ℓpT q “ u˜ℓpT,xN ,yq; ℓ “ 1, . . . N. (21)
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3.2.1 Open loop and closed loop control problem
We use the notation Di and Dij for the partial and second partial derivative with respect to the ith or the ith
and jth variables in XN ptq, respectively; Dp and Dpq for the first and second partial derivative in Yptq.
Assumption 7. There exist two functions H, I : Rn` Ñ R of class C2, such that
bpxN ,yq “ apxN ,yqDHpxq, γpxN ,yq “ ψpxN ,yqDIpyq,
i.e., bip¨q “
řn
j“1 aijp¨qDjHp¨q, γip¨q “
řn
j“1 ψijp¨qDjIp¨q in component wise for i “ 1, . . . , n.
Hence the infinitesimal operator can be written as
Lf “
nÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
aijpxN ,yq
“1
2
Dijf `DifDjHpxN ,yq
‰` nÿ
p“1
nÿ
q“1
ψpqpxN ,yq
“1
2
Dpqf `DpfDqIpxN ,yq
‰
,
and by the definition of θp¨q and λp¨q in (15),
θpxN ,yq ` λpxN ,yq “ spxN ,yqDHpxq ` τpxN ,yqDIpyq. (22)
Then it follows from Ito’s lemma applying on Hp¨q and Ip¨q that
Lptq “ exp
"
´
ż t
0
θ1psq ` λ1psqdW psq ´ 1
2
ż t
0
||θpsq||2 ` ||λpsq||2ds
*
“ exp
"
´HpXN ptqq ´ IpYptqq `Hpxq ` Ipyq ´
ż t
0
kpXN psqq ` k˜pYpsqqds
*
,
where
kpxq :“ ´
nÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
aij
2
rD2ijHpxq `DiHpxqDjHpxqs,
k˜pyq :“ ´
nÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
ψpq
2
rD2pqIpyq `DpIpyqDqIpyqs.
Denote
gℓpxN ,y, πq :“ ecℓVN p0qe´Hpxq´Ipyq, GℓpT,xN ,yq :“ EP“gℓpXN pT q,YpT qqe´ şT0 kpXN ptqq`k˜pYptqqdt‰. (23)
Based on [14] Section 6.4, we have the following assumptions of make sure the solvability of the Cauchy
problem.
Assumption 8. Assume EP
ˇˇ
gℓpXN ptq,Yptqqe´
ş
T
0
kpXN ptqq`k˜pYptqqdt
ˇˇ ă 8. The functions bip¨q, σikp¨q are of class
C1pp0,8qn ˆ p0,8qnq and satisfy the linear growth condition
||bpxN ,yq|| ` ||spxN ,yq|| ď Cp1 ` ||x|| ` ||y||q, pxN ,yq P Rn` ˆ Rn`.
aijp¨q satisfy the nondegeneracy condition, i.e., if there exists a number ǫ ą 0 such that
aijpxN ,yq ě ǫp||x||2 ` ||y||2q, pxN ,yq P Rn` ˆ Rn`.
gℓp¨q is Ho¨lder continuous, uniformly on compact subsets of Rn`ˆRn`, ℓ “ 1, . . . , N . kp¨q and k˜p¨q are continuous
and lower bounded, Gℓp¨q is continuous on p0,8q ˆ p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn, of class C2pp0,8q ˆ p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qnq.
Under Assumption 8, (20) becomes
u˜ℓpT,xN ,yq “ G
ℓpT,xN ,yq
gℓpxN ,yq , (24)
where u˜ℓpτ,xN ,yq P C2pp0,8q ˆ p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qnq is bounded on K ˆ p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn for each compact
K Ă p0,8q. By Feynman-Kac formula, the function Gℓp¨q solves
BGℓ
Bτ pτ,x
N ,yq “ LGℓpτ,xN ,yq ´ `kpxq ` k˜pyq˘Gℓpτ,xN ,yq, t P p0,8q, pxN ,yq P p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn,
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Gℓp0,xN ,yq “ gpxN ,yq, pxN ,yq P p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn.
This yields a Cauchy problem
Bu˜ℓpτ,xN ,yq
Bτ “ Au˜
ℓpτ,xN ,yq, τ P p0,8q, pxN ,yq P p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn, (25)
u˜ℓp0,xN ,yq “ ecℓ , pxN ,yq P p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn, (26)
where
Au˜ℓpτ,xN ,yq “1
2
nÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
aijpxN ,yq
´
D2ij u˜
ℓpτ,xN ,yq ` 2δDiu˜ℓpτ,xN ,yq ¨ rVNp0qs´1
¯
` 1
2
nÿ
p“1
nÿ
q“1
ψpqpxN ,yqD2pqu˜ℓpτ,xN ,yq.
(27)
We emphasize that (25) is determined entirely from the volatility structure of XN p¨q and Yp¨q. Moreover, cℓ
enters into the initial condition (26). Assumption 6 ensures that the Cauchy problem is solvable.
Remark 1. If the market price of risk process depended solely on θp¨q in Assumption 5, then the Cauchy problem
Bu˜ℓpτ,xN ,yq
Bt “ Au˜ℓpτ,xN ,yq involves a terminal term u˜ℓpT q which would largely increase the intractability.
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumption 6, the function u˜ℓ : r0,8q ˆ p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn Ñ p0, 1s is the smallest
nonnegative continuous function, of class C2 on p0,8q ˆ p0,8qn, that satisfies u˜ℓp0, ¨q ” ecℓ and
Bu˜ℓpτ,xN ,yq
Bt ě Au˜
ℓpτ,xN ,yq, (28)
where Ap¨q follows (27).
3.3 Existence of Relative Arbitrage
The Cauchy problem (25)-(26) admits a trivial solution u˜ℓpτ,x,yq ” ecℓ . Meanwhile, We use portfolio generating
functionals, as shown in Section 4, to construct relative arbitrage portfolios for a certain time span. This result
indicates that u˜pτ,x,yq could take values less than 1, that is, the uniqueness of Cauchy problem fails.
Through the Fo¨llmer exit measure [13] we can relate the solution of Cauchy problem uℓp¨q to the maximal
probability of a supermartingale process staying in the interior of the positive orthant through r0, T s. Following
the route suggested by [7] and [26], there exists a probability measure Q on pΩ,Fq, such that P is locally
absolutely continuous with respect to Q: P ăă Q, ΛℓpT q is a Q-martingale, and dP “ ΛℓpT qdQ holds on each
FT , T P p0,8q. We can characterize u˜ℓptq by an auxiliary diffusion which takes values in the nonnegative
orthant r0,8q2n{t0u.
Definition 3.4 (Auxiliary process and the Fichera drift). We define the following
1. The auxiliary process ζℓ “ pζℓ1, . . . , ζℓ2nq is defined as
dζℓi p¨q “ bˆipζp¨qqdt ` σˆikpζp¨qqdWk , ζℓi p0q “ ζℓi , i “ 1, . . . , 2n,
where
bˆipxN ,yq “
#
δ
VN p0q
řn
j“1 aijpxN ,yq if i = 1, . . . , n,
0 if i = n+1, . . . , 2n,
aˆijpxN ,yq “
$’&’%
aijpxN ,yq if i,j = 1, . . . , n,
ψijpxN ,yq if i,j = n+1, . . . , 2n,
0 otherwise.
2. The Fichera drift is defined as
fip¨q :“ bˆipxN ,yq ´ 1
2
nÿ
j“1
Dj aˆijpxN ,yq,
i “ 1, . . . , 2n, pxN ,yq P p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn.
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Assumption 9. The system of ζℓp¨q admits a unique-in-distribution weak solution with values in r0,8qn ˆ
r0,8qn{t0u.
We set T ℓ :“ tt ě 0|ζℓptq P O2nu as the first hitting time of auxiliary process ζℓp¨q to O2n, the boundary of
r0,8q2n.
Proposition 3.3. With the nondegeneracy condition of aij, suppose that the functions σˆikp¨q are continuously
differentiable on p0,8q2n; that the matrix aˆp¨q degenerates on O2n; and that the Fichera drifts for the process
ζℓp¨q can be extended by continuity on r0,8q2n. For an investor ℓ, if fip¨q ě 0 holds on each face of the orthant,
then u˜ℓp¨, ¨q ” 1, and no arbitrage with respect to the market portfolio exists on any time-horizon. If fip¨q ă 0
on each face txi “ 0u, i “ 1, . . . , n and tyi “ 0u, i “ n` 1, . . . , 2n of the orthant, then u˜ℓp¨, ¨q ă 1 and arbitrage
with respect to the market portfolio exists, on every time-horizon r0, T s with T P p0,8q.
Proof. With the nondegeneracy condition of covariance paijq1ďi,jďn, Theorem 2 in [7] suggests that
u˜ℓpT,xN ,yq “ QrT ℓ ą T s, pT,xN ,yq P r0,8qˆ r0,8qn ˆ r0,8qn.
For the first claim, we only need to show the probability QrT ℓ ą T s ” 1, for pT,xN ,yq P r0,8qˆ r0,8qn ˆ
r0,8qn. Denote a bounded and connected C3 boundary GR :“ tz P R2n, zi ă 0, ||z|| ă Ru, and R can be
arbitrarily large. Then the claim follows from Theorem 9.4.1 (or Corollary 9.4.2) of [14], since
nÿ
i“1
ˆ
bˆipxN ,yq ´ 1
2
nÿ
j“1
Dj aˆijpxN ,yq
˙
ni ď 0,
in which n “ pn1, . . . ,n2nq is the outward normal vector at pxN ,yq to O2n, the boundary O2n is an obstacle
from outside of GR, i.e., G :“ BRp0q{GR. The Fichera vector field points toward the domain interior at the
boundary. Let RÑ8, the boundary is not attainable almost surely for pxN ,yq P r0,8q2n.
If fip¨q ă 0 on each face tzi “ 0u, i “ 1, . . . , 2n, then
nÿ
i“1
ˆ
bˆipxN ,yq ´ 1
2
nÿ
j“1
Dj aˆijpxN ,yq
˙
ni ě 0,
and the Fichera drift at O2n points toward the exterior of r0,8q2n. It is equivalent to show that QrT ℓ ą T s ă 1,
for pT,xN ,yq P r0,8q ˆ r0,8qn ˆ r0,8qn, we only need to show QrT ℓ ă T s ą 0, i.e., the boundary tzi “ 0u,
i “ 1, . . . , 2n, is attainable by ζℓp¨q.
From Chapter 11 and 13 in [14], every point in BG is a regular point, and thus
lim
zÑz0,zPG
Qzpτg ă 8, ||ζℓpτgq ´ z0|| ă δq “ 1,
where τg is the exit time from G¯. Therefore, if z0 P Σ :“ Y2ni“1tz P R2n : zi “ 0u X G, for a fixed δ such that
B`δ pz0q :“ X2ni“1tz P R2n : zi ą 0u XBδpz0q is a proper subset of G, we have
• If ||ζℓi ´ z0|| ď η,
Qpτg ă 8, ζℓpτgq P Σq ą 0
• If ||ζℓi ´ z0|| ą η,
inf
zPA
Qzpζℓpτgq P Bδpz0q, τg ă 8q ą 1
2
,
where
A :“
2nč
i“1
tz P R2n : zi ą 0, ||z ´ z0|| “ ηu.
Now take r P A and a continuous sample path ω‹ such that ω‹p0q “ z0, ω‹pτ‹q “ r, and ω‹psq R A for
0 ď s ă τ‹, where τ‹ :“ inftt ą 0 : ζℓptq P Au. Consider an ǫ-neighborhood Nǫ,ω‹ of ω‹ P CpGq,
Nǫ,ω‹ “ tω P CpGq : ωp0q “ ζℓi , ||ω ´ ω‹|| ă ǫ, ωpτ‹q “ ru Ă tω P Ω : ζℓpτ‹, ωq P Au,
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then the support theorem in [28] shows that
Qζℓ
i
pNǫ,ω‹q ą 0,
where φ : r0,8q Ñ R2n is continuously differentiable, and || ¨ ||sT is the supremum norm ||ω1 ´ ω2|| “
sup
0ďsďτ‹ |ω1 ´ ω2|, ω1, ω2 P CpGq. Hence
Qz0pNǫ,ω‹q ď Qz0pτ‹ ă 8, ζpτ‹q P Aq.
Therefore
Qζℓ
i
0pζℓpτgq P Σ, τg ă 8q ě Qζℓ
i
pζℓpτgq P Σ, τg ă 8q
ě Eζℓ
i
rQz0pζℓpτgq P Σ, τg ă 8q ¨ 1pζℓpτ‹q, τ‹ ă 8q|Fτ‹s
“ Eζℓ
i
rQζℓpτ‹qpζℓpτgq P Σ, τg ă 8q ¨ 1pζℓpτ‹q P A, τ‹ ă 8qs
ě Eζℓ
i
r inf
zPA
Qzpζℓpτgq P Σ, τg ă 8q ¨ 1pζℓpτ‹q P A, τ‹ ă 8qs
ě 1
2
Qζℓ
i
pζℓpτ‹q P A, τ‹ ă 8q.
The equality in the above expressions is from the strong Markov property of ζℓp¨q.
In conclusion, the process ζℓp¨q attain the set Y2ni“1tzi “ 0u with positive probability, so u˜ℓp¨, ¨q ă 1 when
Fichera drift fip¨q ă 0.
Therefore investor ℓ can find relative arbitrage opportunities with a unique u˜ℓ, the minimal solution of (28)
given fip¨q ă 0 on each face of O2n.
4 N player game
As we have seen in the previous sections, the stock prices and investors’ wealth are coupled. Variation of
one investor’s strategies contributes to the change of the trading volume of each stock, and thus the change
of stock prices. Consequently, the wealth of others is affected by this investor. In addition, all the investors
considered here are competitive. They attempt to not only behave better than the market index but also beat
the performance of peers exploiting similar opportunities - everyone simultaneously wishes to optimize their
initial wealth to achieve a relative arbitrage.
Investors interact with each other, adopt a plan of actions after analyzing other people’s options, and finally,
make decisions. This motivates us to model the investors as participants in a N -player game.
4.1 Construction of Nash equilibrium
The solution concept of this N -player game is Nash equilibrium. In this spirit, assuming that the others have
already chosen their own strategies, a typical player computes the best response to all the other players, which
amounts to the solution of an optimal control problem to minimize the expected cost u˜ℓ. Specifically, when
investor ℓ assumes the wealth of other players are fixed, they wish to take the solution of (25) and (26) as their
wealth to begin with so that
V ℓpT q ě ecℓVNpT q “ δ ¨ ecℓXNpT q ` p1 ´ δq ¨ ecℓ 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
V ℓpT q
vℓ
.
We articulate the definition of Nash equilibrium in this problem.
Definition 4.1 (Nash Equilibrium). A vector πℓ˚ “ pπℓ˚i , . . . , πℓ˚n q of admissible strategies in Definition 2.1 is
a Nash Equilibrium, if for all πℓi P A and i “ 1, . . . , n,
Jℓpπℓ˚i , π´ℓ˚i q ď Jℓpπℓi , π´ℓ˚i q, (29)
where the cost to investor ℓ yields
Jℓpπq :“ inf
"
ωℓ ą 0 ˇˇV ωℓecℓVN p0q,πℓpT q ě ecℓVNpT q*,
13
where πp¨q “ pπ1p¨q, . . . , πN p¨qq. Hence,
inf
πℓPA
Jℓpπq “ uℓpT q. (30)
Since vℓ “ ωℓVNp0q, the infimum is attained, and
Jℓpπ; 0, x0q “ ecℓ V
N pT q
VN p0q exp
´1
"ż T
0
πℓ1t pβt ´
1
2
αtπ
ℓ
t qdt`
ż T
0
πℓ1t σiptqdWt
*
ď ωℓ. (31)
Each individual aims to minimize the relative amount of initial capital, beginning with which one can match or
exceed the benchmark.
Definition 4.2. With the same conditions in Definition 2.2, we define empirical measures of the random vectors`
V ℓptq
vℓ
˘
ℓ“1,...,N
P RN` , given the initial measure µN0 P P2pR`q,
µN :“ 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
δpV ℓ{vℓq.
Subsequently, we clarify the notion of unique Nash equilibrium we will apply in this paper. Investors pay
more attention to the change of the wealth processes than the change of the strategies, since two different strategy
processes may result in the same wealth at time T . Therefore we investigate the uniqueness in distribution of
wealth, and we use the strong uniqueness here because it satisfies the nature of the investment goal in this
paper.
Definition 4.3. We say that the uniqueness holds for Nash equilibrium if any two solutions µNa , µ
N
b , defined
on pΩ,F ,F,Pq, with the same initial law µN
0
P P2pR`q,
PrµNa “ µNb s “ 1,
where µN is the empirical distribution of wealth processes as in definition 4.2.
We construct the fixed point condition on the control space. Suppose we start from a control π, then solve
the equation of wealth processes (5) and trading volume (7) with the equation of optimal cost function (28).
If the corresponding optimal strategy π‹ agree with π, then the associated µN is the Nash equilibrium. We
specify the pathodology below.
Searching Nash equilibrium in N-player game
1. Suppose we start with a given set of control processes π :“ pπ1, . . . , πN q. With the empirical distribution
µN and νN , solve the N -particle system (9) and (10).
2. We get Jℓp¨q from µN and νN . Solve u˜ℓpT q :“ infπPA Jℓpπq and the corresponding optimal control π‹. We
find a function Φ so that π‹ “ Φpπq.
3. If there exists πˆ, such that πˆ “ Φpπˆq, then µN‹ :“ 1
N
řN
ℓ“1 δpV vℓ,πˆℓ {vℓq is the Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Open-loop and closed loop Nash equilibrium
We recall the information structure and the types of actions that players take in a game. It is an open loop Nash
equilibrium if the admissible strategies satisfy the conditions of Definition 4.1, with the control πℓptq given by
the form
πℓptq “ φℓpt,v,Wr0,tsq, (32)
for every t ě 0, v :“ pv1, . . . , vN q, vℓ “ u˜ℓpT qVNp0q, Wr0,ts is the path of the Wiener process between time
0 and time t deterministic functions φℓ : r0, T s ˆ Ω Ñ A, ℓ “ 1, . . . , N . Here, π´ℓ is the process with the
same trajectories as the pπ1‹, . . . , πℓ‹, . . . , πN˚q, even after player ℓ changes strategy from πℓ˚ to πℓ. Thus the
strategies πk for k ‰ ℓ of the other players are not affected from the deviation of player ℓ.
However, in closed loop equilibria, the trajectory of the state of the system enters the strategies, then when
ℓ change πℓ˚ptq to πℓptq, other players is likely to be affected. Players at time t have complete information of
the states of all the other players at time t, or in other words we allow feedback strategies. As a special case in
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closed loop equilibria, a Markovian equilibrium is the admissible strategies profile π‹ “ pπ1‹, . . . , πℓ‹, . . . , πN‹q
of the form
πℓpsq “ φℓps,Vt,xs q, (33)
for each pt, xq, where φℓ : r0, T s ˆ Ωˆ Rn` Ñ A, Vt,xs :“ pV 1psq, . . . , V N psqqt,x, and pV ℓpsqqtďsďT is the unique
solution of
dV ℓpsq
V ℓpsq “
nÿ
i“1
πℓi psq
dXNi psq
XNi psq
, V ℓptq “ vℓt , t ď s ď T.
We have the following result of Nash equilibrium strategies.
Theorem 4.1. Nash equilibrium is attained when the strategies yield
πℓ‹i “miptq `XNi ptqDiv¯N ptq ` τiptqσ´1ptqDpi v¯N ptq. (34)
for ℓ “ 1, . . . , N , where v¯N ptq “ log u˜ℓpT ´ t,XNr0,ts,Yr0,tsq ` p 1´δδXNt q
1
N
řN
ℓ“1
V ℓptq
vℓ
log u˜ℓpT ´ t,XNr0,ts,Yr0,tsq. The
corresponding Nash equilibrium µN‹ is unique in the sense of Definition 4.3 when the first exit time from the
compact set K is greater than T , i.e., τK ą T where
K “
„
0,
`
N ´ p1´ δqřNℓ“1 ecℓ u˜ℓpT ´ tq˘2
Nδ|řNℓ“1 ecℓDmu˜ℓpT ´ tq|

, τK “ inftt ě 0;XNptq P Ku. (35)
Proof. For a given choice of π P A, u˜ℓ :“ infπPA Jℓpπq is uniquely determined by the smallest nonnegative
solution of (28). For simplicity we denote u˜ℓpT ´ t,XNr0,ts,Yr0,tsq. Assuming that all controls πkp¨q, k ‰ ℓ are
chosen, player ℓ will choose the optimal strategy π‹ that achieves V ℓ‹p¨q “ ecℓVNptqu˜ℓpT ´ tq. Suppose every
player ℓ follows V ℓ‹p¨q, we have a fixed point problem that yields
V ℓ‹ptq “ ecℓ u˜ℓpT ´ tqδXN ptq
ˆ
1` p1´ δq
řN
ℓ“1 e
cℓ u˜ℓpT ´ tq{vℓ
N ´ p1´ δqřNℓ“1 ecℓ u˜ℓpT ´ tq{vℓ
˙
, (36)
equivalently,
logV ℓ‹ptq “ log δx0e
cℓ u˜ℓpT q
1´ p1´ δq 1
N
řN
ℓ“1 e
cℓ u˜ℓpT q{vℓ
`
ż t
0
m1spβs ´
1
2
αsmsqds`
ż t
0
m1tσipsqdWs
` log u˜ℓpT ´ tq ´ log `1´ p1´ δq 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
ecℓ u˜ℓpT ´ tq{vℓ˘. (37)
With a fixed set of control processes π, we solve u˜ℓT´t, and expect that the π
‹ will coincide with the fixed
π. Thus we can find the Nash equilibrium strategy by comparing V ℓ‹ in (37) and V ℓ defined in (10). By Ito’s
formula on u˜ℓp¨q as a function of XNr0,ts and Yr0,ts, we obtain
du˜ℓpT ´ tq “ pLu˜ℓ ´ Bu˜
ℓ
BpT ´ tq qpT ´ tqdt`
nÿ
k“1
RℓkpT ´ t,XNr0,ts,Yr0,tsqdWkptq,
where L is the infinitesimal generator of pxN ,yq P p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn, i.e.,
Lu˜ℓpτq “bpxN ,yq ¨ Bxu˜ℓpτq ` γpxN ,yq ¨ Byu˜ℓpτq
` 1
2
tr
“
apxN ,yq ¨ B2xxu˜ℓpτq ` ψpxN ,yq ¨ B2yyu˜ℓpτq ` psτ 1 ` τs1qpxN ,yq ¨ B2xyu˜ℓpτq
‰
and
Rℓkpτ,xN ,yq “
nÿ
i“1
σikpxN ,yqxiDiu˜ℓpτq `
nÿ
p“1
τpkpxN ,yqDpu˜ℓpτq.
Thus the volatility term in (37) isż t
0
m1ipsqσipsqdW psq `
ż t
0
1
u˜ℓpT ´ sq
nÿ
k“1
RℓkpT ´ sqdWkpsq `
p1´ δqVN ptq
NδXNptq
ż t
0
Nÿ
ℓ“1
ecℓ
vℓ
nÿ
k“1
RℓkpT ´ sqdWkpsq.
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By comparing the drift and volatility of (10) and (37), we arrive at (34).
Next, to investigate the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, we consider a fixed point mapping Φ : R` Ñ R` of
the empirical mean of wealth mNt from (36),
ΦpmNt q :“
δXN ptqřNℓ“1 ecℓ u˜ℓpmNt q{vℓ
N ´ p1´ δqřNℓ“1 ecℓ u˜ℓpmNt q{vℓ .
Denote Dm as the partial derivative with respect to m
N
t , then the derivative of ΦpmNt q is
Φ1pmNt q “
NδXNptqřNℓ“1 ecℓDmu˜ℓpT ´ tq{vℓ`
N ´ p1´ δqřNℓ“1 ecℓ u˜ℓpT ´ tq{vℓ˘2 .
We denote At “ N´p1´δq
řN
ℓ“1 e
cℓ u˜ℓpT´tq{vℓ. In the above derivative, Dmu˜ℓpT´tq “
řN
p“1Dpu˜
ℓpT´tqφℓ for
open loop controls, and Dmu˜
ℓpmNt q “
řN
p“1Dpu˜
ℓpT ´tqpφℓ`φℓ1V ℓq when π is of a closed loop form. In addition
0 ă u˜ℓpT ´ tq ď 1, cℓ ď ǫ for a positive ǫ, Bφℓ{BV ℓ is bounded by Lipschitz coefficient L under Assumption 3.
Hence |Φ1pmNt q| ă 1 is satisfied when
0 ď XN ptq ă A
2
t
Nδ|řNℓ“1 ecℓDmu˜ℓpT ´ tq{vℓ| . (38)
For simplicity, we set Dt “ Nδ|
řN
ℓ“1 e
cℓDmu˜
ℓpT ´ tq{vℓ|, and K :“ r0, A2t
Dt
q. By mean value theorem, Φ is a
contraction of mNt . The first exit time for the compact set K is τ
K “ inftt ě 0;XNptq P Ku. If τK ą T then
Nash equilibrium generated by (34) is unique.
By (12), logXNptq is of the same distribution as logVmptq. Thus, XN ptq is a log-normal distribution where
logXNptq ∼ N
ˆ
log xN ` `mptqβptq ´ 1
2
m1ptqαptqmptq˘t, m1ptqαptqmptqt˙.
As a result, with the solution u˜ of (28), the probability of attaining the unique Nash equilibrium is
P pXN ptq P Kq “ N
ˆ
log
A2t
DtxN
´ `mptqβptq ´ 1
2
m1ptqαptqmptq˘t
m1ptqαptqmptqt
˙
,
where N is the cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian distribution.
The end of Section 3.2 suggests that optimal strategies are linearly dependent on ecℓ , ℓ “ 1, . . . , N . To
illustrate, the investors pursuing relative arbitrage end up with the terminal wealth V ℓpT q proportional to ecℓ
if starting from a same initial wealth. However, at every time t, the information of every V ℓptq, ℓ “ 1, . . . , N
is required to pinpoint the optimal strategy. Therefore, a mean field regime is discussed in the next chapter to
resolve the complexity in N -player game.
As a special case when investment decisions are based upon the current market environment only, we consider
the Markovian dynamics so that we write uℓpT ´ t,XN ptq,Yptqq. We can obtain the optimal strategies in a
different way. This approach will be useful when we derive the mean field equilibriums in the next section.
Assumption 10. In addtion to Assumption 6, we assume βptq, σptq, γptq and τptq take values in Rn` ˆ Rn`,
and are Markovian, i.e.,
XNi ptqβiptq “ bipXN ptq,Yptqq, XNi ptqσikptq “ sikpXN ptq,Yptqq,
nÿ
k“1
sikptqsjkptq “ aijpXN ptq,Yptqq,
γiptq “ γipXN ptq,Yptqq, τiptq “ τipXN ptq,Yptqq.
Proposition 4.1. Under Assumption 10, when controls of a closed loop Markovian form (33), or an open loop
φpt,v,Wtq are adopted, there is a Nash equilibrium π‹ “ pπ1‹, . . . , πN‹q, where for ℓ “ 1, . . . , N , πℓ‹ follows
πℓ‹ptq “miptq `XNi ptqDiv˜N ptq ` τiptqσ´1ptqDpi v˜N ptq,
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where
v˜N ptq “ log u˜ℓpT ´ t,xN ,yq `
´ 1´ δ
δXN ptq
¯ 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
V ℓptq
vℓ
log u˜ℓpT ´ t,xN ,yq, (39)
and u˜ℓptq is the smallest nonnegative solution in (28).
Proof. The Markov property of VN p¨q gives
EP
“
VNpT qLpT q|Fptq‰
VN ptqLptq “
EP
“
VN pT ´ tqLpT ´ tq‰
VN ptqLptq “ u˜
ℓpT ´ t,XN ptq,Yptqq,
where u˜ℓp¨q is the minimal nonnegative solution of (28). Again we use the property for 0 ď t ď T that
V ℓptq “ VN ptqu˜ℓpT ´ t,XN ptq,Yptqq, the deflated wealth process
Vˆ ℓptq :“ V ℓptqLptq “ EP“VN pT qLpT q|Ft‰
is a martingale. As a result, the dt terms in dVˆ ℓptq will vanish, namely,
Vˆ ℓptq “ Vˆ ℓp0q `
nÿ
k“1
ż t
0
Vˆ ℓpsqBkpT ´ s,X psq,YpsqqdWkpsq, 0 ď t ď T, (40)
where
Bkpt, x, πq “
nÿ
i“1
σikpxN ,yqxiDi log u˜ℓpT ´ t,xN ,yq `
nÿ
m“1
τmkpxN ,yqDm log u˜ℓpT ´ t,xN ,yq
`
nÿ
i“1
δXNptq
VNptq
ˆ
xiřn
i“1 xi
σikptq ´ΘkpxN ,yq
˙
` p1 ´ δq{N
VN ptq
nÿ
i“1
Nÿ
ℓ“1
ˆ
V ℓptq
vℓ
πℓiσikptq ´
V ℓptq
vℓ
ΘkpxN ,yq
˙
.
Thus we have the fixed point problem
πℓ‹i ptq “ XNi ptqDi log u˜ℓpT ´ t,xN ,yq ` τipxN ,yqσ´1pxN ,yqDk log u˜ℓpT ´ t,xN ,yq
` δX
Nptq
VN ptq miptq `
p1´ δq
NVNptq
Nÿ
ℓ“1
V ℓ‹ptq
vℓ
πℓ‹i ptq,
(41)
where V ℓ‹ptq is generated from πℓ‹ptq.
Next, we check the consistency condition of π‹ in (41) and π we start with. Define a map ρ : A Ñ A, we
want to find a fixed point so that ρpπq “ π. By Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, since A is a compact convex set,
there exists a fixed point for the mapping ρ. In Nash equilibrium, we assume that all players follow the strategy
π‹ - if we multiply both sides by V ℓ and then summing over ℓ “ 1, . . . , n in (41), and after some computations
we conclude
πℓ‹i “miptq `XiptqDiv˜N ptq ` τiptqσ´1ptqDkv˜N ptq, (42)
where v˜N ptq satisfies (39).
4.3 Equilibrium with functional generated portfolios
I is the identity matrix of size n, and 1 is a n-dimension column of ones. Now we want to show M contains
strong arbitrage opportunities relative to the performance benchmark, at least for sufficiently large real numbers
T ą 0. We illustrate this path by example 4.1. We employ the idea of functional generated portfolios [9] to seek
optimal strategies. By doing so, we may reduce the intractability of the N -player game problem.
The market portfolio follows the dynamic
dmiptq “miptq
„
γmi dt`
nÿ
k“1
τmik ptqdWkptq

, i “ 1, . . . , n. (43)
Here τmptq is the matrix with entries τmik ptq :“ σikptq ´
řn
j“1mjptqσjkptq, ei is the ith unit vector in Rn and
the vector γmptq is with the entries γmi ptq :“ pei ´mptqq1pβptq ´ αptqmptqq.
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Theorem 4.2. Let G1, G2 : U Ñ p0,8q be positive C2 functions defined on a neighborhood U of A such that
for all i, xiDi logG1pxq, xiDi logG2pxq are bounded on A. For t P r0, T s, G1, G2 generate the portfolio
πℓptq “ rG1ptq ` rG2ptq `Rptq (44)
where
rG1ptq “ pDi logG1pmptqqmiptqqnpI´1mptqq; rG2ptq “ D logG2pYptqqτptqσ´1ptq; Rptq “ δXNi ptq ` p1´ δqYptq
VN ptq .
The process
d log
V ℓptq
ecℓVN ptq “ d logG2pYptqq ` d logG1pmptqq ` dΞt, t P r0, T s, a.s. (45)
is with a drift process Ξp¨q such that a.s., for t P r0, T s,
dΞptq
dt
“ rG1ptqαptqmptq ` rG2ptqαptqπℓptq ´ 1
2
ˆ
|| rG1ptqσ||2 ` || rG2ptqσ||2 ´ ||πℓ1σ||2˙
` 1
2G1pmptqq
nÿ
i,j“1
DijG1pmptqqmiptqmjptqp
nÿ
k“1
τmik ptqτmjkptqq `
1
2G2pYptqq
nÿ
i,j“1
DijG2pYptqqψijptq,
More importantly, the notion of optimal strategies (42) can be treated through Theorem 4.2. Let G1, G2 :“
U Ñ p0,8q be positive C2 functions defined on a neighborhood U of A such that for all i, xiDi logG1pxq,
xiDi logG2pxq are bounded on A. We write u˜ℓpt,x,yq “ wℓpt, pmiqi“1,...,n, pYiqi“1,...,nq, then by taking deriva-
tives of XN ptq, Yptq, it follows
XNi ptqDi log u˜ℓpT ´ t,XN ptq,Yptqq “
„
Di logG1pmptqq ´
nÿ
i“1
Di logG1pmptqqqmiptq

miptq;
τipxN ,yqσ´1pxN ,yqDpi log u˜ℓpT ´ t,XN ptq,Yptqq “ pDi logG2pYptqqqnτptqσ´1ptqei.
Furthermore, we can use portfolio generating functions to find conditions on investment strategies byřn
i“1 πiptq “ 1, t P r0, T s. We get
1´ δ
NδXNptq
Nÿ
ℓ“1
V ℓt w
ℓ
t “ wℓt ,
where wℓt :“ XiptqDi log u˜ℓptq ` τiptqσ´1ptqDpi log u˜ℓptq. Hence
řN
ℓ“1 V
ℓptqwℓptq “ 0 or δXNptq “ p1 ´
δq 1
N
řN
ℓ“1 V
ℓptq. The latter indicates that the market is exactly consisted of the N investors we considered. If
wℓptq “ 0, then every investor is the same, and their strategy follows the market portfolio. If wℓptq ‰ 0, then
11 rG2ptq “ 0, and
nÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“1
Di logG2ptqpτptqσ´1ptqqji “ 0. (46)
Example 4.1. Suppose that M is nondegenerate, weakly diverse in [0,T], and has bounded variance, see Ap-
pendix A for the definitions. We assume for t P r0, T s, there exists constants c0, Nc,Mπ ą 0 such thatpV ℓptq{pV ℓp0q ě c0XN ptqLptq;
Yiptq{miptq ď Nc, i “ 1, . . . , n;
|
nÿ
i“1
γiptq| ďMπ.
Consider the function G1 and G2 are defined by
G1pxq “
nź
i“1
xi, G2pxq “ 1´ 1
2
nÿ
i“1
x2i .
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G1 and G2 generate the portfolio
πℓi ptq “ 1´
´
n` δX
Nptq
VNptq
¯
miptq ` p1´ δqYiptq
VNptq `
ˆ ´Yptq
G2pYptqq
˙1
τptqσ´1ptqei, i “ 1, . . . , n. (47)
Then πℓ strictly dominates VN ptq in (13) if
T ě nN
2 ´ 2n2 ´ 2
´2ǫn` 2Mπn2 ´ 2n2M0
1´N
2
2n
`Mn2
´
npn´ 1q ` N2
1´N
2
2
λ2
max
pτq
λ2
min
pσ´1q
¯ .
The notations of constants and details of the proof can be found in Appendix C.
5 Mean Field Games
We have observed that it is unlikely to get a tractable equilibrium from N -player game, especially when N is
large. In this section, we study relative arbitrage for the infinite limit population of players. With propagation
of chaos results provided, a player in a large game limit should feel the presence of other players through the
statistical distribution of states and actions. Then they make decisions through a modified objective involves
mean field as N Ñ8. For this reason, we expect MFG framework to be more tractable than N -player games.
5.1 Formulation of Extended Mean Field Games
We formulate the model on pΩ,F ,F “ pFtqtPr0,T s,Pq which support Brownian motion B, a n-dimensional
common noise B, equally distributed as W . The systemic effect of random noises towards the market might be
different when we consider a finite or infinite group of investors interacting with the market. B is adapted to the
P-augmentation of F and can explain the limit random noises in the market M when N Ñ 8. The admissible
strategies πp¨q P AMF follow similiar conditions as (6) and is FB-progressively measurable.
In general, the stock prices and state processes depend on the joint distribution of pV ℓ, πℓi q, ℓ “ 1, . . . , N ,
while the cost function is related to the empirical distribution of the private states. With a given initial condition
µ0 P P2pCpr0, T s;R`qq as a degenerate distribution of value 1, we define the conditional law of V ptq{v0 given
FB as
µt :“ LawpV ptq
v0
|FBt q, (48)
and the conditional law of pV ptq, πptqq given FB, with a given initial condition ν0 P P2pCpr0, T s;R` ˆ Aqq, is
νt :“ LawpV ptq, πptq|FBt q.
Assumption 11. Assume x P L2pΩ,F0,P;Rn`q, and Ersup0ďtďT ||pV ptq, Xptqq||2s ď 8.
Under Assumption 11, the mean field game model contains McKean-Vlasov SDEs of stock prices and wealth
dX ptq “ X ptqβpX ptq, νtqdt` X ptqσpX ptq, νtqdBt, X0 “ x;
dV ptq{V ptq “
nÿ
i“1
πiptqdXiptq{Xiptq. (49)
From Proposition D.1-D.3, we show that the above McKean-Vlasov problem admits a unique solution,
where νt :“ LawpV ptq, πptq|FBt q. Furthermore, the weak limit of νN in Definition 2.2 is exactly νt, V ℓptq is
asymptotically identical independent copies given the common noise B when ℓ “ 1, . . . , N , N Ñ 8. Hence we
consider a representative player which is randomly selected from the infinite number of investors in mean field
set-up. Small deviations of a single player would not influence the entire system given the common noise B.
The player competes with the market and the entire group with respect to the benchmark
VpT q “ δ ¨XpT q ` p1´ δq ¨ µT ,
and they try to minimize the relative amount of initial capital. The objective is
Jµ,νpπ; 0, x0q :“ inf
"
ω ą 0 ˇˇV ωecVp0q,πpT q ě ecVpT q*. (50)
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5.2 Mean Field Equilibrium
Specifically, if the mean field interaction is through the expected investments of an investor on assets - the
conditional expectation of the product of wealth and controls, a representative player’s wealth is
dZt “ dEpV ptqπptq|FBt q “ γpX ptq, Ztqdt` τpX ptq, ZtqdBt, Z0 “ z0, (51)
with
dXiptq “ XiptqβpX ptq, Ztqqdt`XiptqσpX ptq, ZtqdBt, Xip0q “ xi,0.
Mean field equilibrium appears as a fixed point of best response function.
Definition 5.1. (Mean Field Equilibrium) Let π‹p¨q P AMF be an admissible strategy, then it gives mean field
equilibrium (MFE) if Jµ,ν in (50) satisfies
Jµ,νpπ‹q “ inf
πPAMF
Jµ,νpπq.
In particular, Aˆ “ arg infπPA Jµ,νpπq denotes the set of optimal controls. In the control problem, the flow
of measure pmT , ZpT qq is frozen conditional on the common noise. pmT , ZpT qq is an equilibrium if there exists
π‹ P Aˆ such that the fixed point of the mean field measure exists, i.e., mT “ ErV ‹T |FBT s; ZpT q “ ErZ‹T |FBT s.
Definition 5.2. We say that uniqueness holds for the MFG equilibrium if any two solutions µa, µb, defined on
filtered probabilistic set-ups pΩ,F ,F,Pq, with the same initial law µ0 P P2pR`q,
Prµa “ µbs “ 1,
where µ is the distribution of wealth processes as in (48).
When F “ FX,Z “ FB, the representative agent’s optimal initial proportion to achieve relative arbitrage can
be characterized as
upT q :“ inf
πPAMF
Jµ,νpπq “ ErecVpT qLpT qs{Vp0q, (52)
and it solves a single Cauchy problem as opposed to the N -dimensional PDEs system in N -player game,
Bu˜pτ,x, z,mq
Bτ ě Au˜pτ,x, z,mq, u˜p0,x, z,mq “ e
c, (53)
where Au˜pτ,x, z,mq “1
2
nÿ
i“1
nÿ
j“1
aijpx, zq
ˆ
D2ij u˜pτ,x, z,mq `
2δDiu˜pτ,x, z,mq
Vp0q
˙
` 1
2
nÿ
p“1
nÿ
q“1
ψpqpx, zq
ˆ
D2pqu˜pτ,x, z,mq
˙
` Lmu˜pτ,x, z,mq,
for τ P p0,8q, pxN ,yq P p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn.
Note that Z‹ “ ErV ‹π‹|FBs is not expected to be unique. Moreover, since the diffusion process of ZpT q
is given by Definition 2.1(3) and (51), we consider the fixed point over the control space when it comes to
ZpT q “ ErZ‹T |FBT s. The steps of searching equilibrium for extended mean field game with joint measure of
state and control is formulated in [4]. The paper [6] manifests an example of extended mean field games with
application in price anarchy. They use two different measures as law of the state processes and the law of control.
The equilibrium approaching steps we introduce is different in that a modified version of extended mean field
game is discussed, where the state processes and cost functional depend on different measures, and uniqueness
of Nash equilibrium is specified here. In the following, we show the steps to attain a unique equilibrium in open
loop or closed loop Markovian form.
Steps of Solving Mean Field Game
(i) Start with a fixed φ such that π “ pπptqq0ďtďT “ φpv, Br0,T sq or φpV ptqq, the open loop and feedback
function respectively, and solve
dV ptq “ πptqβpX ptq, Ztqdt` πptqσpX ptq, ZtqdBt, V p0q “ u˜pT qVp0q :“ v0,
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dXiptq “ XiptqβipX ptq, Ztqdt`Xiptq
nÿ
k“1
σikpX ptq, ZtqdBkptq, i “ 1, . . . , n,
where Zt “ ErV ptqπptq|FBt s for 0 ď t ď T .
(ii) For each arbitrary stochastic process m “ pmtq0ďtďT on R` adapted to the filtration generated by the
random measure B, solve
inf
πPAMF
Jm,Zpπq “ upT q “ E“ec`δXpT q ` p1´ δqmt˘LpT q‰ {Vp0q,
using XpT q from step (i). The corresponding φ‹ :“ arg infπPAMF Jµ,νpπq “ arg infπPAMF Jm,Zpπq. Define
the mapping φ‹ “ Φpφq.
(iii) If there exists φˆ such that φˆ‹ “ Φpφˆq, find m so that for all 0 ď t ď T , mt “ ErV ‹t |FBt s, where V ‹ is the
optimal path with φ‹ as a minimizer of Jm,Zpφq.
Here the fixed point is formulated on both the control space and the flows of measure.
Theorem 5.1. Under Assumption 2,3, 10 and 11, there exists a unique Mean Field Equilibrium µ‹.The corre-
sponding Nash equilibrium µ‹ is unique in the sense of Definition 4.3 when the first exit time from the compact
set K˜ is greater than T , i.e., τ˜K ą T where
K˜ “
„
0,
`
1´ p1´ δqErecu˜pT ´ tq|FBt s
˘2
δ
ˇˇ
ErecDmu˜pT ´ tq|FBt s
ˇˇ  , τ˜K “ inftt ě 0;Xptq P K˜u, (54)
Proof. For simplicity we denote u˜pT ´ t,x, z,mq “ u˜pT ´ tq. We fix the process m solve the optimal control
problem for V ‹. Suppose every player follows V ‹ptq “ V‹ptqu˜pT ´ tq, we solve a fixed point problem which
yields
V ‹ptq “ e
cδX‹t u˜T´t
1´ p1´ δqErecu˜pT ´ tq{v0|FBt s
. (55)
As in Theorem 4.1, after comparing logV ‹ptq in (49) and (55), this yields
π‹i ptq “miptq `XiptqDiv˜ptq ` τiptqσ´1ptqDkv˜ptq,
where v˜ptq “ log u˜T´t ` 1´δδXtEr
V ptq
v0
log u˜T´t|FBt s, and u˜T´t is the smallest nonnegative solution in (53).
We can further derive the expression of π‹ when u˜ is Markovian. We restrict mt in the form of EpV |FBt q,
for each i. From now on, we use vol to represent the volatility of a process, as we are not given the explicit
form of mt. By Ito’s formula we have
Vˆ ptq “ Vˆ p0q `
nÿ
k“1
ż t
0
Vˆ psqBkpT ´ s,X psq,ZpsqqdWkpsq, 0 ď t ď T, (56)
where
Bkpτ, x, zq “
nÿ
i“1
σikpx, zqxiDi log u˜ℓpτ,x, z,mq ` τmpx, zqDm log u˜ℓpτ,x, z,mq
`
nÿ
i“1
δXptq{x0
Vptq
ˆ
xiřn
i“1 xi
σikptq ´Θkpx, zq
˙
` p1´ δq
Vptq volpdLtmtq.
By comparing (16) and (56), the strategy used for V ‹ should be
π‹i ptq “ X‹i ptqDi log u˜pT ´ tq ` τipx, zqσ´1px, zqDk log u˜pT ´ tq
` δX
‹ptq
V‹ptq miptq `
p1 ´ δq
V‹ptq volpdLtmtqσ
´1.
(57)
The derivation of π‹ ensures that it generates a wealth process V ‹, thus π‹ P AMF .
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Next, we show the equilibrium is unique. Denote Φpmtq :“ ErV ptq|Bs, it is equivalent to show that there is
the unique fixed point mapping Φpmtq “ mt. We have
mt “ Φpmtq “ δX
‹ptqErecu˜pT ´ t,mq{v0|FBt s
1´ p1 ´ δqErecu˜pT ´ t,mq{v0|FBt s
,
Φ1pmtq “ δX
‹ptqErecDmu˜pT ´ t,mq{v0|FBt s`
1´ p1´ δqErecu˜pT ´ t,mq{v0|FBt s
˘2 ,
First, Φ : R` Ñ R` is a continuous function, since from Appendix D we have
Er||V ν1 ´ V ptqν2 ||2t |FBt s ď p2t` 2qL2Er
ż t
0
W22 pν1, ν2qdrs, (58)
for any fixed mt P R`, Φpmtq “ ErV ptq|FBt s P R`. Furthermore, we set A˜t “ 1´p1´δqErecu˜pT ´ t,mq{v0|FBt s,
D˜t “ δ
ˇˇ
ErecDmu˜pT ´ t,mq{v0|FBt s
ˇˇ
. By mean value theorem, Φ is a contraction of mt if τ˜
K ą T , where
τ˜K “ inftt ě 0;Xptq P K˜u, K˜ :“ r0, A˜2t
D˜t
q. As a result, the mean field equilibrium generated by (57) is unique
when the first exit time from K˜ is less than T . The probability of attaining the unique mean field equilibrium
is
P pXptq P K˜q “ N
ˆ
log
A2t
Dtx
´ `mptqβptq ´ 1
2
m1ptqαptqmptq˘t
m1ptqαptqmptqt
˙
,
where N is the cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian distribution, x is initial value of total
capitalization Xp¨q.
It is clear from (57) that the mean field strategy actually depends on pX ptq, Zptq,mtq, which means the
optimal strategies are driven by stock prices, trading volumes and relative arbitrage benchmark. Similiarly to
N -player game, π is independent of preference c, meaning that the representative player’s preference level c is
not a crucial factor when determining strategies.
5.3 Example
Next, we encompass a simplified class of market models to shed some light on mean field regimes, where the
models exhibit selected characteristics of real equity markets and provide a tractable mean field equilibrium.
The class of models is inspired by the volatility-stabilized markets introduced in [10].
Example 5.1. In real markets, the smaller stocks tend to have greater volatility than the larger stocks. Mean-
while, the higher the trading volume of a stock, the larger the volatility of the trading. The parameters β, σ, γ,
τ in M are set to the following specific forms which agree with these market behaviors. For 1 ď i, j ď n, with
infinite number of investors,
βiptq “ p1` ζq Ziptq
2miptq , aij “ Xiptqδij ;
γiptq “ βiptq; ψijptq “ Ziptqδij .
We can check that the Fichera drift fip¨q ă 0. Similiarly to Proposition 3.3, we can get u˜p¨q ă 1.
By Theorem 5.1, the optimal strategy πℓ‹i of investor ℓ in a mean field game is
π‹i ptq “XiptqDi log u˜‹T´t ` τiptqσ´1i ptqDpi log u˜‹T´t ` volpmtqσ´1i ptqDm log u˜‹T´t
` δXptqmiptq
δXptq ` p1´ δqmt ` volpdLtmtqσ
´1ptq 1´ δ
δXptq ` p1´ δqmt .
We denote pt as the conditional density of V ptq given Bt, which follows
dpt “ ´p1` ζqBv
“
V ptq
nÿ
i“1
πiptq ziptq
2miptqpt
‰
dt´ V ptq
nÿ
i“1
πiptqpXiptqq 12 BvptdBt.
Next, plug π‹i ptq into the equation of pt, and let mt “
ş
vptpvqdv, i.e., the consistency condition, we get
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dmt “ ´p1` ζq
ż
mt
`
X
´ 1
2
i ptqz´
1
2
i ptqBvvolpmtq
1
mt
´X´ 12i ptqz´
1
2
i ptq
1
m2t
volpmtqBvmt
´ 2δp1´ δqXptqziptqp2δXptq ` 2p1´ δqmtq2 Bvmt
˘
dvdt
´ 2
ż
mt
`Bvvolpmtq 1
mt
´ 1
m2t
volpmtqBvmt ´ δp1´ δqX
3
2
i ptqz
1
2
i ptq
pδXptq ` p1´ δqmtq2 Bvmt
˘
dvdBt
´ 2
ż
mtLt
` p1´ δqpΘtBvmt ` Bvvolpmtqq
δXptq ` p1 ´ δqmt `
p1´ δq2pΘtmt ` volpmtqq
pδXptq ` p1´ δqmtq2 Bvmt
˘
dvdt,
where
volpmtq “
ż
δp1´ δqX 32i ptqz
1
2
i ptq
pδXptq ` p1´ δqmtq2 Bvmtdv
„
16
ş
1
mt
Bvmtdv
3p3´ 4 ş 1
mt
Bvmtdvq
` 4
3

.
With the explicit mt expression, we can obtain closed form solution of π
‹ptq in terms of X ptq, Zptq, u˜T´t.
If δ “ 0, meaning a investor intend to achieve relative arbitrage with respect to peer competitors, and
Bu˜pτ,x, zq
Bτ “
2ÿ
i“1
XipτqD2iiu˜px, zq `
2ÿ
p“1
ZppτqD2ppu˜px, zq. (59)
We separate the variables τ , x1, x2, z1, and z2. We denote S
kpxq as the function for x1, x2, z1, and z2,
when k “ 1, 2, 3, 4, repsectively. T pτq “ ec`ξτ . A general solution can be found as
Skpxq “ x 12k rc1J1p2p´Ckxkq
1
2 q ` c2Y1p2p´Ckxkq 12 qs,
where
ř4
k“1 Ck “ ξ, J1 and Y1 are order 1 Bessel function of first and second kind, respectively. It concludes
u˜ “ ec`ξτś4k“1 Skpxkq, which is the smallest amount of initial capital proportion that a generic investor need
to outperform the others, given it is the minimal nonnegative solution of (59). Thus we can get an explicit
equilibrium if we have the information on X ptq and Zptq and initial condition x, z0. A numerical scheme for
the relative arbitrage problem will be considered elsewhere.
6 The relationship of N-player game and mean field game
In this last section we justify if mean field game is an appropriate generalization of N -player relative arbitrage
problem.
6.1 From finite games to mean field games
We conclude in the following proposition that the MFE we obtain agrees with the limit of the finite equilibrium,
and that the optimal arbitrage in the sense of (19) strongly converges to optimal arbitrage in the mean field
game setting (52).
Proposition 6.1. Suppose pβ, σ, γ, τqpt,x, zq take values in RnˆGLpnqˆRnˆGLpnq is bounded and continuous
in every variable. If πp¨q is Markovian, and mintτK , τ˜Ku ą T , then upT q “ limNÑ8 uℓpT q a.s, for T P p0,8q.
Proof. It follows from Appendix D, P ˝ pXN ,V, νN ,W q is tight on the space Cpr0, T s;Rn`q ˆ Cpr0, T s;RN` q ˆ
P2pCpr0, T s;R`ˆAqqˆCpr0, T s;Rnq and the weak limit exists. We proved in Proposition D.2 that the equilib-
rium µ is the weak limit of µN conditional on B. What left here to show is that the optimal cost in finite game
converges to the mean field optimal cost, since u˜ and π are both bounded. By using the Markovian property of
πp¨q, bp¨q and σp¨q, we would have
u˜ℓpT ´ tq :“ E
P
“
ecℓVNpT ´ tqLpT ´ tq‰
VN ptqLptq .
Then by the bounded convergence theorem and Proposition D.2, the deflator LpX ptq, Zptqq “ limNÑ8 LpXN ptq,Yptqq
a.s., and VpT q “ limNÑ8 VN pT q in the weak sense. cℓ is i.i.d samples from Lawpcq.
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Therefore as N Ñ8,
uℓpT q :“ inf
πPA
Jℓpπℓ‹q Ñ inf
πPAMF
Jµ,νpπ‹q “ upT q
almost surely, and upT ´ tq is the weak limit of uℓpT ´ tq when t ą 0.
6.2 From mean field games to finite games
We show here that MFE can be used to construct an approximate Nash equilibrium for the N -player game.
Since we derive strong equilibrium in both N -player and mean field game, µN and µ are measurable with respect
to the information generated by W and B, respectively.
From (57), the mean field control in general is of the form
π‹i ptq “ φpXiptq,X ptq, µt, νt, u˜T´tq. (60)
Definition 6.1. For ǫN ě 0, an open-loop ǫN -equilibrium is a tuple of admissible controls
φN :“ pφN,1ptq, . . . , φN,Nptqq0ďtďT , φN,ℓptq P A Ă ∆n,
for every ℓ, such that
JℓpφN q ď inf
pPA
Jℓpp, φN,´ℓq ` ǫN ,
where p P A is an open loop control, and φ is of the form in (60). An closed-loop ǫN -equilibrium is a tuple φN
such that
JℓpφN q ď inf
pPA
JℓppN q ` ǫN ,
where each component in φN is defined in (60); pN :“ pppUr0,tsq, φN,´ℓpUr0,tsqq, in which Ut is the N -vector
of wealth processes generated by this strategy, p : r0, T s ˆ Cpr0, T s;RN` q Ñ A is of the form pppt, Ur0,tsqq0ďtďT ,
φN,´ℓ is defined in (60). For any ℓ “ 1, . . . , N , φN,ℓ and p are F-progressively measurable functions.
Proposition 6.2. Under Assumption 2, 3, and 12, assume u˜T´t is Lipschitz in pX ptq, µt, νtq, there exists a
sequence of positive real numbers pǫN qNě1 converging to 0, such that any admissible strategy πℓ “ pπℓt qtPr0,T s
for the first player
JN,ℓpp1, π2‹, . . . , πN,‹q ě J ´ ǫN , ℓ “ 1, . . . , N.
Proof. We look into the approximate open and closed loop Nash equilibrium. Without loss of generality, by the
symmetry of the game, we focus on player 1. For a fixed number of players N , each player utilizes the optimal
strategy π‹ from the associated mean field game, i.e., the strategy set is πN :“ pπ‹t , . . . , π‹t q as in (60). The
rest part of the proof is mainly adapted to the general method on [4]. We articulate the different part from
general method: when πN deviates to pp, π´1q, the state processes are V 1ptq and V ℓptq, ℓ ‰ 1, and the empirical
measures are
µNt “
1
N
ˆ
δV 1ptq `
Nÿ
ℓ“2
δV ‹ℓptq
˙
, νNt “
1
N
ˆ
δpV 1ptq,pq `
Nÿ
ℓ“2
δpV ‹ℓptq,π‹q
˙
.
We can show pµNt , νNt q Ñ pµt, νtq in open loop, and pU1t , µNt , νNt q Ñ pV pt , µt, νtq in closed loop in the similiar
vein of Proposition D.1 and D.2.
µN
0
d“µ0, xN d“x, By Ito’s isometry and L2 convergence we get
lim
NÑ8
JN ppp, π´1q; 0,xN q “ Jµ,νpp; 0,xq.
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Appendices
A Market dynamics and conditions
This section recalls some properties of the market which are used to show the existence of relative arbitrage.
Definition A.1 (Non-degeneracy and bounded variance). A market is a family M “ tX1, . . . , Xnu of n stocks,
each of which is defined as in (3), such that the matrix αptq is nonsingular for every t P r0,8q, a.s. The market
M is called nondegenerate if there exists a number ǫ ą 0 such that for x P Rn
PpxαptqxT ě ǫ||x||2,@t P r0,8qq “ 1,
The market M has bounded variance from above, if there exists a number M ą 0 such that for x P Rn
PpxαptqxT ďM ||x||2,@t P r0,8qq “ 1,
Remark 2. Let π be a portfolio in a nondegenerate market. Then there exists an ǫ ą 0 such that for i “ 1, . . . , n,
τπiiptq ě ǫp1´ πmaxptqq2,@t P r0,8q (61)
almost surely. Indeed, this is directly from definition A.1, and τπiiptq “ αiiptq´2αiπptq`αππptq, where αππptq “
π1ptqαptqπptq. Details of the proof can be found in [9].
Intuitively, no single company can ever be allowed to dominate the entire market in terms of relative capi-
talization.
Definition A.2 (Diversity of market). The model M of (3), (4) is diverse on the time-horizon r0, T s, with
T ą 0 a given real number, if there exists a number η P p0, 1q such that
max
1ďiďn
mi :“mp1q ă 1´ η,@ 0 ď t ď T (62)
almost surely and M is weakly diverse if there exists a number η P p0, 1q such that
1
T
ż T
0
mp1qptqdt ă 1´ η,@ 0 ď t ď T (63)
almost surely.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. For (2), Since everyone follows V
ℓpT q
vℓ
ě ecℓ
vℓ
VN pT q, we sum up this expression for
ℓ “ 1, . . . , N to get an inequality of řNk“1 V kptq{N . (17) follows immediately. Next, (3) can be easily derived
from Definition 3.1 that
cℓ ď log
ˆ
V ℓpT q
δXNptq ` p1 ´ δq 1
N
řN
ℓ“1
V ℓpT q
vℓ
˙
.
B Relative arbitrage and Cauchy problem
Proof of Proposition 3.2. From Ito’s formula, discounted process pV ℓp¨q admits
dpV ℓptq “ pV ℓptqπℓ1ptq`βptq ´ σptqΘptq˘dt` pV ℓptq`πℓ1ptqσptq ´Θ1ptq˘dW ptq; pV ℓp0q “ pvℓ,
and pV ℓp¨q is a supermartingale. For this reason, we get from (19) that for an arbitrary ωℓ,
ωℓVN p0q ě E“pV ℓ‰ ě E„ pXpT qδecℓ ` LpT qp1´ δqecℓ 1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
V ℓpT q
vℓ

:“ pℓ.
Hence, uℓpT q ě pℓ.
To prove the opposite direction uℓpT q ď pℓ, we use martingale representation theorem (Theorem 4.3.4, [23])
to find
U ℓptq :“ E“ecℓVNpT qLpT q|Ft‰ “ ż t
0
p˜1psqdWs ` pℓ, 0 ď t ď T, (64)
where p˜ : r0, T s ˆΩÑ Rk is F-progressively measurable and almost surely square integrable. Next, construct a
wealth process V˚p¨q “ U ℓp¨q{Lp¨q, it satisfies V˚p0q “ pℓ, V˚pT q “ ecℓVN pT q. If we plug a trading strategy
h˚p¨q “ 1
Lp¨qV ℓp¨qα
´1p¨qσp¨qrp˜p¨q ` U ℓp¨qΘp¨qs,
into (16), further calculations imply V˚p¨q ” V p,h˚p¨q ě 0 a.s. V p,h˚p¨q is the wealth process from h˚p¨q.
Therefore, h˚p¨q P A with exact replication property V p,h˚pT q “ ecℓVN pT q a.s. Consequently, pℓ ě uℓpT q for
pℓ
VNp0q P
 
ω ą 0|Dπℓ P A, given π´ℓp¨q P AN´1, s.t.V ωVNp0q,πℓ ě ecℓVN pT q(.
Thus, we proved uℓpT q “ E“ecℓVN pT qLpT q‰ {VNp0q.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose a solution of (28) and (26) is w˜ℓ : C2pp0,8q ˆ p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qnq Ñ p0,8q.
Define N˜ptq :“ w˜ℓpT ´ t,XNr0,ts,Yr0,tsqecℓVN ptqLptq, 0 ď t ď T .
By calculating dN˜ptq{N˜ptq and using the inequality (28), we get that the dt terms in dN˜ptq{N˜ptq is always
no greater than 0. N˜ptq is a local supermartingale. And since N˜ptq “ w˜ℓpT ´ t,Xr0,ts,Yr0,tsqecℓVNptqLptq ě 0,
N˜ptq is a supermartingale.
Hence N˜p0q “ w˜ℓpT,x,yqVN p0q ě EPrN˜ptqs “ EPrecℓVN pT qLpT qs holds for every pT,x,yq P p0,8q ˆ
p0,8qn ˆ p0,8qn. Then w˜ℓpT,x,yq ě EP“ecℓVN pT qLpT q‰{VN p0q “ u˜ℓpT,x,yq.
C Function Generated Portfolios
Proof of Theorem 4.2. By Ito’s lemma,
d log
V ℓptq
ecℓVN ptq “
“
πℓ1ptqpβptq ´ αptq
2
πℓptqq ´R1ptqβptq ` 1
2
||R1ptqσptq||2‰dt` “πℓ1ptq ´R1ptq‰σptqdW ptq. (65)
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Since G1 and G2 are twice continuously differentiable function, it follows
Dij logG1pmptqq “ DijG1pmptqq
G1pmptqq ´Di logG1pmptqqDj logG1pmptqq,
Dij logG2pYptqq “ DijG2pYptqq
G2pYptqq ´Di logG2pYptqqDj logG2pYptqq
(66)
Then using (66) and Ito’s lemma, the right hand side of (45) becomes
d logG1pmptqq ` d logG2pYptqq “
nÿ
i“1
Di logG1pmptqqdmiptq
` 1
2G1pmptqq
nÿ
i,j“1
DijG1pmptqqmiptqmjptqp
nÿ
k“1
τmik ptqτmjkptqqdt
´ 1
2
nÿ
i,j“1
Di logG1pmptqqDj logG1pmptqqmiptqmjptqp
nÿ
k“1
τmik ptqτmjkptqqdt
`
nÿ
i“1
Di logG2pYptqqdYiptq ` 1
2G2pYptqq
nÿ
i,j“1
DijG2pYptqqψijptqdt
´ 1
2
nÿ
i,j“1
Di logG2pYptqqDj logG2pYptqqψijptqdt,
(67)
The local martingale part of (65) and (67) are the same, and this leads to
πℓ1ptq “ “pDi logG1pmptqqmiptqq1npI ´ 1m1ptqq ` pDi logG2pYptqqqnτptqσ´1ptq‰`Rptq,
for t P r0, T s, and for each k. Substitute this result into (65),
d log
V ℓ
ecℓVptq “d logG2pYptqq ` d logG1pmptqq
´
! rG1ptqp´αptqmptqq ` rG2ptqp´αptqπℓptqq ` 1
2
`|| rG1ptqσ||2 ` || rG2ptqσ||2 ´ ||πℓ1σ||2˘
´ 1
2G1pmptqq
nÿ
i,j“1
DijG1pmptqqmiptqmjptqp
nÿ
k“1
τmik ptqτmjkptqq
´ 1
2G2pYptqq
nÿ
i,j“1
DijG2pYptqqψijptq
)
dt.
Lemma C.1. A matrix A is semi-definite if and only if pxAy1q2 ď pxAx1qpyAy1q for all x, y in Rn. The equality
holds if and only if xA and yA are linearly dependent.
Lemma C.2. If A “ paijq is positive semi-definite matrix, then there is an index k such that akk ě aij, for
any i and j. In other words, the largest entry of the matrix A appears on the diagonal.
We show here the derivation in Example 4.1.
Proof of Example 4.1. LetM be a market without dividends. Suppose thatM is nondegerate and has bounded
variance. SupposeM is weakly diverse in [0,T]. Consider the function G1 and G2 are defined as in example 4.1.aśn
i“1mi ď
řn
i“1
mi
n
ď
bř
n
i“1
m2
i
n
implies that
0 ďG1pmq ď 1
n2
, 1´ N
2
2
ďG2pYptqq ď 1´ N
2
2n
then
1´ N
2
2
ď logG1pmq ` logG2pYptqq ď 1
n2
` 1´ N
2
2n
.
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The portfolio (47) generated by G1 and G2 implies
πℓi ą maxt0, 1´ pn` δXNptq{VN ptqqp1 ´ ηq `
ˆ ´Yptq
G2pYptqq
˙1
τptqσ´1ptqeiu; (68)
πℓi ă mint1`
1´ δ
N
pV ℓptqq1N pπℓi ptqqN {VNptq `
ˆ ´Yptq
G2pYptqq
˙1
τptqσ´1ptqei, 1u. (69)
Denote maxi“1,...,nmi “ mp1q, mini“1,...,nmi “ mpnq, maxi“1,...,n πi “ πp1q, mini“1,...,n πi “ πpnq, and the
eigenvalues of αptq: maxi“1,...,n λi “ λp1q, mini“1,...,n λi “ λpnq. mmax :“ pmp1q,mp1q, . . . ,mp1qq.
We’ll use the following results to simplify ΞpT q:
(i) M is nondegenerate, weakly diverse and has bounded variation;
(ii) 1
n
ď řni“1m2i ď 1 implies that 0 ď ||p1´ nmq|| ďanpn´ 1q;řn
i“1pπℓi q2 ď 1 implies ||
řN
ℓ“1 π
ℓ1ptqτσ´1||2 ď ||
řN
ℓ“1 π
ℓ1ptq||2 ¨ ||τ ||2 ¨ ||σ´1||2 ď N
b
λmaxpψq
λminpαq
, where the
norm for τ and σ´1 is matrix induced norm. For a matrix A P Rmˆn, aTracepAA1q “ ||A||F ď ?n||A||2,
where || ¨ ||2 is the matrix induced norm. Tracepττπ1q “
řn
i“1
řN
ℓ“1 τ
ℓ
ii ě nǫ
řN
ℓ“1p1´ πℓp1qq2, then ||τ ||2 ě
ǫ
řN
ℓ“1p1´ πℓp1qq2;
(iii) |βi| and |αij | for any i and j is bounded by lemma C.2, thus we could easily get Yptqτptqσ´1ptqβptq ąM0;
By lemma C.1, e1iαptqmptq ď pe1iαptqeiqpm1ptqαptqmptqq ď MM 1||mptq||2 ď MM 1, where e1iαptqei ď
M ||ei||2, m1ptqαptqmptq ďM 1||mptq||2.
ΞpT q “
ż T
0
#
pei ´mptqq1αptqmptq ` ´Yptq
G2pYptqq
`
γπptq ´ τσ´1ptqβptq˘ ` dℓptqαptq
2
dℓ1ptq
+
dt
(i)
ď
ż T
0
#
e1iαptqmp1qptq1´ ǫ||m||2 `
1
G2pYptqq
Nÿ
ℓ“1
πm1ptq`γπptq ´ τσ´1ptqβptq˘
` M
2
”
||1´ nm||2 ` 1
G2pYptqq ||
Nÿ
ℓ“1
πℓ1ptqτ ℓσ´1||2
ı
´ ǫ
2
||πℓ||2
+
dt
(ii,iii)
ď T
”
MM 1 ´ ǫ
n
` Mπ
1´ N2
2
´ M0
1´ N2
2n
` M
2
´
npn´ 1q ` N
2
p1 ´ N2
2
q2
λ2p1qpτq
λ2pnqpσ´1q
¯ı
´ ǫ
2
ż T
0
max
i
|πℓi |2dt
where
dℓptq :“ 1´ nm´ πℓptq ` ´Yptq
G2pYptqqτσ
´1,
max
i
|πℓi |2 ą
“
maxt0, 1´ pn` cℓδX
N ptq
Vptq qp1 ´ ηq ´
Yiptq
G2pYptqqτptqσ
´1ptqeiu
‰2
.
Hence, for t P r0, T s,
log
V ℓ
ecℓVN ptq “ logG2pYptqq ` logG1pmptqq ` Ξt
ď 1` 1
n2
´ N
2
2n
` T
”
MM 1 ´ ǫ
n
` Mπ
1´ N2
2
´ M0
1´ N2
2n
` M
2
´
npn´ 1q ` N
2
1´ N2
2
λ2maxpτq
λ2
min
pσ´1q
¯ı
.
Then π strictly dominates the weighted average VN ptq if
T ě nN
2 ´ 2n2 ´ 2
´2ǫn` 2Mπn2 ´ 2n2M0
1´N
2
2n
`Mn2
´
npn´ 1q ` N2
1´N
2
2
λ2
max
pτq
λ2
min
pσ´1q
¯ .
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D Limiting behavior of finite games vs mean field games
Differentiating from the usual Mckean-Vlasov SDEs of the form that the coefficients of the diffusion depend
on the distribution of the solution itself, we here consider the joint distribution of the state processes and the
control, and show the propagation of chaos holds.
In this section we attempt to show that in the limitN Ñ 8, a vector of stock prices X ptq :“ pX1ptq, . . . , Xnptqq
and the wealth of a representative player will satisfy Mckean-Vlasov SDEs. Namely,
dX ptq “ X ptqβpX ptq, νtqdt` X ptqσpX ptq, νtqdBt, X0 “ x; (70)
dV ptq “ πptqβpX ptq, νtqdt` πptqσpX ptq, νtqdBt, V p0q “ v0, (71)
where Bt “ pB1, . . . , Bnq is n-dimensional Brownian motion, ν :“ LawpV, π|FBt q. v0 is with the same law as
vℓ, and it is supported on pΩ,F ,F,Pq.
Remark 3. In this section, we analyze a Mckean-Vlasov system with initial states given, but we shall see in
mean field games sections that it is given in the form as v0 “ u˜pT qVp0q.
The following proposition shows that νN has a weak limit ν P P2pCpr0, T s;Rn ˆAqq with W2 distance. We
denote Cn,N “ Cpr0, T s;Rn ˆ Aq for simplicity.
Proposition D.1. Under Assumption 2, 3, and 11, there exists a unique strong solution of the Mckean-Vlasov
system (70)-(71).
Proof. Define the truncated supremum norm ||x||t and the truncated Wasserstein distance on P2pCn,N q as in
[19]. ||x||2t :“ sup0ďsďt |xs|,
d2t pµ, νq “ inf
πPΠpµ,νq
ż
CnˆCn
||x´ y||2tπpdx, dyq.
Define a map Φ : P2pCn,Nq Ñ P2pCn,N q so that Φpνq “ LawpV ν , πν |FBq. Fix ν, solve (70) and (71). Since
solutions of (70) and (71) are equivalent to fixed points of Φ, we begin by proving that Φ is a contraction
mapping in a complete space Cn,N .
We take two arbitrary measures νa, νb P P2pCn,N q, and denote the wealth involving measure ν as V ν , and
stock price vector involving ν as X ν . By Cauchy-Schwartz and Jensen’s inequality, Lipschitz conditions in
Assumption 2 and 3, it follows
E
“||pV νa ,X νaq ´ pV νb ,X νbq||2t |FBt ‰
ď2tE
„ ż t
0
|V νaprqπνa prqβpx, νaq ´ V νbprqπνb prqβpx, νbq|2 ` |bpx, νaq ´ bpx, νaq|2dr
ˇˇˇˇ
FBt

` 2E
„
sup
0ďsďt
|
ż s
0
V ν
aprqπνa prqσpx, νaq ´ V νbprqπνb prqσpx, νbqdBr|2 ` sup
0ďsďt
|
ż s
0
X ν
a
r σpx, νaq ´ X ν
b
r σpx, νbqdBr|2
ˇˇˇˇ
FBt

ďp2t` 2qL2E
„ ż t
0
p|V νar ´ V ν
b
r |2 ` |X ν
a
r ´ X ν
b
r |2 `W22 pνar , νbrqqdr
ˇˇˇˇ
FBt

By Gronwall’s inequality,
Er||V νa ´ V νb ||2t |FBt s ď Er||pV ν
a
,X ν
aq ´ pV νb ,X νbq||2t |FBt s ď p2t` 2qL2Er
ż t
0
W2
2
pνar , νbrqdrs. (72)
If π is open loop control, i.e., πptq “ φpv0, νt, Br0,T sq,
Er||πνa ´ πνb ||2t |FBt s ď 2L2Er|vν
a
0 ´ vν
b
0 |2 ` |Bν
a
r0,ts ´Bν
b
r0,ts|2 `W22 pνa, νbq|FBt s ď 2L2ErW22 pνat , νbt qs. (73)
If π is closed loop Markovian, i.e., πptq “ φpt, V ptq, νtq,
Er||πνa ´ πνb ||2t |FBt s ď 2L2Er||V ν
a ´ V νb ||2t `W22 pνat , νbt qs ď 4pt` 1qL4Er
ż t
0
W2
2
pνar , νbrqdrs. (74)
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Then the coupling of Φpν1q,Φpν2q gives the following inequality
d2t pΦpνaq,Φpνbqq ď Er||pV ν
a
, πν
aq ´ pV νb , πνbq||2T |FBT s
ď CTEr
ż T
0
W2pνar , νbrqdrs
ď
ż T
0
d2rpνar , νbrqdr,
(75)
where CT “ 2pT ` 2qL2 ` 4pT ` 1qL4 for closed loop Markovian controls, and CT “ 2pT ` 2qL2 for open loop
controls.
Following Picard iteration scheme, choose an arbitrary ν0 P P2pCn,Nq,
νℓ`1 “ Φpνℓq,
Φ has been proved as an contraction mapping when 0 ă T ă 1
2L2
´2, L ă 1
2
and thus Φ has a unique fixed point
and νℓ converges to ν by the contraction mapping principle. For T ą 1
2L2
´ 2, we prove the above argument for
rT, 2T s, r2T, 3T s, etc.
Subsequently, we show in the following proposition that MFE strategies coincide with the limit of optimal
empirical measure in the weak sense.
Proposition D.2. There exists limits for measure flows νN P P2pCn,N q, µN P P2pCpr0, T s;R`qq, i.e., the
limits νt “ limNÑ8 νNt , µt “ limNÑ8 µNt exist in the weak sense for t P r0, T s with respect to the 2-Wasserstein
distance.
Proof. Let pU ℓq be the solution of closed loop Markovian dynamics φℓ : r0, T s ˆ R` Ñ A,
dU ℓptq “ U ℓptqφℓpt, U ℓptqqβpXt, νtqdt` U ℓptqφℓpt, U ℓptqqσpXt, νtqdBt, U ℓp0q “ vℓ,
or of open loop dynamics
dU ℓptq “ U ℓptqφℓpvℓ, Br0,T sqβpXt, νtqdt` U ℓptqφℓpvℓ, Br0,T sqσpXt, νtqdBt, U ℓp0q “ vℓ.
for ℓ “ 1, . . . , N . The initial states vℓ are i.i.d copies of v. We assume the initial value of U ℓp0q is of the same
law with V ℓp0q.
Er||pV ℓ, φℓpV ℓqq ´ pU ℓ, φℓpU ℓqq||2t s ď CTE
“ ż t
0
W2
2
pνNr , νrqdr
‰ ď CTE“ ż t
0
d2rpνn, νqdr
‰
(76)
for t P r0, T s, CT is defined in Proposition D.1. For simplicity, let us discuss in the case of closed loop dynamics,
the result of which can be generalized to open loop dynamics.
ν˜N are the empirical measure of N i.i.d samples U ℓ. We follow the coupling arguments in [4], the empirical
measure of pV ℓ, U ℓq is a coupling of the N -player empirical measure νN defined in Definition 2.2 and ν˜N .
d2t pνN , ν˜N q ď
1
N
Nÿ
ℓ“1
||pV ℓ, φℓpV ℓqq ´ pU ℓ, φℓpU ℓqq||2t , a.s.. (77)
By the triangle inequality and (76), (77),
Erd2t pνN , νqdrs ď 2Erd2t pν˜N , νqs ` 2CTEr
ż t
0
d2rpνN , νqdrs,
and then by Gronwall’s inequality and set t “ T , it follows
ErW22 pνN , νqs ď 2e2CTTErW22 pν˜N , νqs.
Since pU ℓ, πℓq, ℓ “ 1, . . . , N is independent given the noise B, use conditional law of large numbers (Theorem
3.5 in [22]),
P
`
lim
nÑ8
Nÿ
ℓ“1
fpU ℓ, πℓq ´ ErfpU ℓ, πℓq|FBt sq “ 1, for everyf P CbpRn
˘
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We then use Theorem 6.6 in [25], which states that on a separable metric space, νN Ñ ν weakly.
lim
NÑ8
ż
RN
dpx, x0q2νN pdxq “
ż
RN
dpx, x0q2νpdxq a.s.,
which lead us to
ErW2
2
pν˜N , νqs Ñ 0.
Therefore ErW22 pνN , νqs Ñ 0. We can use similiar methods to derive ErW22 pµN , µqs Ñ 0.
Assumption 12. There are the following bounds on β and σ:ż t
s
|βipr, ωq|dr ď ηpω, νq|t ´ s|
1`β
α ,
ż t
s
|σ2ijpr, ωq|dr ď ξpω, νq|t´ s|
1`β
α ,
where t, s P r0, T s, α and β are positive constants, and η,ξ being F-measurable random variables with values in
p0,8q ˆ Ωˆ Cn,N such that there is ǫ ą 0 with Erηpω, νq2s ă 8, Erξpω, νq2s ă 8.
Proposition D.3. If Assumption 12 holds, then there exist n dimensional continuous process X defined on the
probability space pΩ,F ,Pq, such that X ptq “ limNÑ8XN ptq exists a.s. for all t P r0, T s.
Proof. First we show that tPXN u is tight. By [17], a sequence of measures µN on P2pCpr0, T s;R`qq is tight if
and only if
• there exist positive constants Mx and γ such that Et|xN |γu ďMx for every N “ 1, 2, . . .,
• there exist positive constants Mk and δ1, δ2 such that Et|XN ptq ´ XN psq|δ1u ď Mk|t ´ s|1`δ2 for every
N “ 1, 2, . . ., t, s P r0, T s.
Apparently, the first condition holds. Then,
|XN ptq ´ XN psq|α ď Nα{2p|XN
1
ptq ´XN
1
psq|α ` . . .` |XNn ptq ´XNn psq|αq,
|XNi ptq´XNi psq|α “ |
ż t
s
XNi prqβiprqdr`
nÿ
k“1
ż t
s
XNi prqσikprqdWkprq|α ď pn`1qαpηpω, νqα|t´s|1`β`
nÿ
k“1
|
ż t
s
σikprqdWkprq|αq.
Then let α “ 2 in Assumption 12, by Ito’s isometry,
Er|XN ptq ´ XN psq|2s ď Nα{2pn` 1qα
ˆ
Erηpω, νq2sh1`β `
nÿ
i“1
nÿ
k“1
E
“ ż t
s
|σikprq|2dWkprq
‰˙
ď Npn` 1q2
ˆ
Erηpω, νq2s ` Erξpω, νq2s
˙
h1`β,
where Erηpω, νq2s ` Erξpω, νq2s ă 8,h P p0, T s. Thus the second condition follows.
By Prokhorov theorem [2], tightness implies relative compactness, which means here that each subsequence
of XN contains a further subsequence converging weakly on the space Cpr0, T s;Rn`q. As a result, a subsequence
exists such that X ptq “ limNÑ8XN ptq a.s.. Then if every finite dimensional distribution of tPXN u converges,
then the limit of tPXN u is unique and hence tPXN u converges weakly to P as N Ñ8.
Proposition D.4. Under Assumption 2, X ptq “ limNÑ8 XN ptq exists in the weak sense, and the limit Xptq
match the solution of the Mckean-Vlasov SDE
dXiptq “ XiptqβipX ptq, νtqdt`XiptqσipX ptq, νtqdBt
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Proof. Since νt “ limNÑ8 νNt , it is equivalent to show that the drift and volatility of νt matches the weak limit
of that of νNt , i.e.,
βpX ptq, νtq “ lim
NÑ8
βpXN ptq, νN ptqq, σpX ptq, νtq “ lim
NÑ8
σpXN ptq, νN ptqq.
in the weak sense.
By Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem
||
ż t
0
βpXNs , νNs q ´ βpXs, νsqds||2L2 ď
ż t
0
||βpXNs , νNs q ´ βpXs, νsq||2L2ds
ď LEr
ż t
0
|XNs ´ Xs|2ds`
ż t
0
W2pνNs , νsq2dss
By Ito’s isometry and Assumption 2, we have
||
ż t
0
σpXNs , νNs qdWs ´
ż t
0
σpXs, νsqdBs||2L2 “ Er
ż t
0
|σpXNs , νNs q ´ σpXs, νsq|2dss
ď LEr
ż t
0
|XNs ´ Xs|2 `W22 pνNs , νsqdss.
Hence it follows from the fact that X ptq “ limNÑ8 XN ptq a.s., νt weakly convergent to νN ptq with W2, we
get X ptq satisfies
dX ptq “ X ptqβpX ptq, νtqdt` X ptqσpX ptq, νtqdBt
Finally, under Assumption 6 we conclude that when N Ñ 8, the limiting system is driven by Xt and
νt :“ LawpV ptq, πptqq. The stock market follows
dXt “ X ptqβpXt, νt|FBt qqdt` X ptqσpXt, νt|FBt qdBt, X0 “ x,
and a generic player’s wealth is
dV ptq “ πptqβpX ptq, νt |FBt qqdt` πptqσpX ptq, νt|FBt qdBt, V p0q “ v0. (78)
With the notations in Definition 2.1 (3), if we consider the mean Zptq of the measure LawpV ptq, πptq|FBt q, we
can get Zptq “ limNÑ8 Y ptq exists in the weak sense, and the limit Zptqmatch the solution of the Mckean-Vlasov
SDE
dZptq “ γpXt, Zptqqdt` τpXt, ZptqqdBt. (79)
This is used primarily in Section 5 and 6.
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